



Genie Capital

STRUCTURAL DIAGNOSIS · STRATEGIC FORESIGHT PROTOCOL

Zenith Bank PLC:

Structural Diagnosis and Scenarios

October 2026



About this report

PREPARED FOR	Investors, Shareholders, Executives, Board and the Public
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
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Executive Summary


Zenith Bank is not in distress. It is Nigeria’s Tier-1 capital leader for the seventeenth consecutive year, the most profitable lender on the Nigerian Exchange, and the holder of the largest retail deposit franchise in the market. Its balance sheet is strong, its regulatory capital position is the highest among Nigerian banks, and its wholesale banking franchise — corporate lending, trade finance, custody, sovereign finance — remains unmatched by any domestic competitor, including the fintechs.



Zenith at a glance: FY 2025 and market position. Sources: Zenith FY 2025 results; Nairametrics; BusinessDay.

The diagnosis that follows is not about solvency, liquidity, or near-term earnings. It is about structural alignment: whether the bank’s capital, organisational energy, and strategic focus are deployed where they generate the highest risk-adjusted return, and whether the entity is positioned to remain economically relevant over the next ten to twenty years as the Nigerian financial system continues to mutate around it.

The conclusion is that Zenith faces a genuine structural fork. Its retail franchise is a wasting asset: valuable today, priced on current earnings and deposit balances, but declining in terminal value as the 25–40 urban cohort banks elsewhere. Its corporate, sovereign, and investment banking franchise is a compounding asset: under-resourced relative to the opportunity, and structurally reinforced by every dimension in which Zenith has a durable competitive advantage.




The structural fork: a wasting retail asset and a compounding wholesale asset.

The retirement of founder Jim Ovia and the appointment of Mustafa Bello as chairman is not incidental to this diagnosis. It is the pivotal governance event that will determine which trajectory is executable — and which is not.

Three trajectories are available. Each is economically coherent. This report sets out all three with their tradeoffs, costs, and expected outcomes.

Evolution — 1990 to 2026



Zenith Bank: key milestones, 1990–2026.

1.1 Founding and the Capital Adequacy Bet (1990–1999)

Zenith Bank was incorporated on 30 May 1990, granted a banking licence in June 1990, and commenced operations on 16 June 1990. It was founded by Jim Ovia, a former Barclays clerk who had trained in the United States, with initial capital of approximately \$4–5 million.

Nigeria in 1990 had a banking sector characterised by weak capital adequacy, poor operational standards, and a small number of licensed institutions serving a corporate and government clientele. Ovia's strategic bet was that capital adequacy and operational efficiency would differentiate a new entrant in a market where most competitors were undercapitalised and poorly managed. He prioritised technology infrastructure and disciplined risk management from the outset — choices that would later prove decisive during every subsequent banking crisis.

1.2 Consolidation and Scale (2000–2010)

Zenith converted to a public limited liability company and listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in October 2004. The 2004–2005 banking consolidation under CBN Governor Charles Soludo, which raised the minimum capital requirement from ₦2 billion to ₦25 billion and reduced the number of banks from 89 to 25, was a defining moment. Zenith not only met the new threshold but used the consolidation to expand its balance sheet, branch network, and corporate relationships.

By the end of the decade, Zenith had established itself as a Tier-1 Nigerian bank with a growing retail presence, an expanding African subsidiary network (Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia), and a UK subsidiary. It had also developed a reputation for conservatism — a reputation that, in the Nigerian context, is a competitive advantage. Zenith survived every banking crisis since 1990 without requiring a CBN bailout.

1.3 The Scale-Building Decade (2011–2023)

The 2010s were Zenith’s scale-building decade. The bank became the first Nigerian deposit money bank to surpass the ₦1 trillion profit mark. It retained its position as Nigeria’s number one bank by Tier-1 capital, year after year. It expanded its international footprint, deepened its corporate and sovereign relationships, and built the largest retail deposit franchise in the market.

By 2023, Zenith was universally recognised as one of Nigeria’s “FUGAZ” banks — the five largest and most systemically important institutions. Its brand was synonymous with institutional reliability, corporate trust, and custodial credibility. When a multinational needed to move \$50 million or a state government required payroll infrastructure, Zenith was the preferred counterparty.

But the market around it was changing faster than the bank’s internal operating model. The smartphone revolution, the agent-banking explosion, and the rise of fintech challengers were rewriting the rules of retail financial services. Zenith’s strengths — conservatism, institutional discipline, relationship banking — were assets in wholesale banking and liabilities in the fast-moving consumer fintech arena.


1.4 The Current Inflection (2024–2026)

Three structural events have defined the current moment.

First, the CBN recapitalisation. The 2024–2026 recapitalisation exercise raised the minimum capital requirement for internationally licensed banks to ₦500 billion. Zenith raised over ₦350 billion through a combination of rights issues and public offers — including a heavily oversubscribed public offer — lifting its paid-up share capital to ₦614.6 billion, the highest among Nigerian banks and more than ₦100 billion above the regulatory minimum. This is a position of strength, but it also concentrates the bank’s capital in a single regulatory entity.

Second, the leadership transition. In May 2026, founder Jim Ovia retired as chairman after twelve years, in line with regulatory tenure limits for financial holding companies. The Board appointed Mustafa Bello — a former Minister of Commerce, former Director-General of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, and the board’s longest-serving director — as his successor, with CBN approval. The transition is orderly and governance-compliant. But it is also a signal: the Board has chosen an institutional figure to lead the next phase, not a retail or technology figure.


Third, the fintech inflection. A KPMG and Orange Group Nigeria study found that OPay is installed on 69% of Nigerian smartphones, PalmPay on 29%, and Moniepoint on 14%. Zenith’s app is on 9%. The 25–40 age cohort in Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt is no longer opening Zenith accounts as a first choice. This is not a temporary competitive disadvantage. It is a structural shift in where retail financial relationships are formed and held.



Installed base of leading financial apps on Nigerian smartphones. Source: KPMG and Orange Group Nigeria study, as reported by Technext.ng.

Structural Diagnosis

Through the lens of the Strategic Foresight Protocol, a franchise is read along four dimensions: the transactions it processes, the identity it projects and holds, the commitment it earns, and the projection of structure built on top of them. The reading below takes each in turn.




The Strategic Foresight Protocol reading of Zenith Bank.

2.1 Transaction Volume: Abundant, Not the Constraint

Metric	FY 2025	Q1 2026	Signal
Gross earnings	₦4.19tn (+6%)	₦1.01tn (+6.1%)	Strong
Profit after tax	₦1.04tn	₦314.02bn (+0.69%)	Stable
Interest income	—	₦869.1bn (+3.8%)	Strong
Net interest income	—	₦634.1bn (+7.2%)	Strong
Customer deposits	₦24.47tn (+7.9%)	₦24.47tn	Largest in market
Retail deposits	₦11.56tn (+9.4%)	—	Market leader
Retail customers	40.1 million	—	Large base

Transaction flow is not the problem. Zenith processes more mobile transaction volume than any other Nigerian bank. Its deposit base is the largest in the market. Its interest income is growing. Its non-performing loan ratio actually improved to 3.8% from 4.7%. There is no transaction drought.



Retail deposits as a share of total customer deposits, FY 2025.

2.2 Identity: Intact, But Coupled to a Maturing Constituency

Zenith's identity is authentic and strong. It is Nigeria's number one bank by Tier-1 capital for the seventeenth consecutive year. It was named Africa's Best Bank and Nigeria's Best Bank at the Euromoney Awards for Excellence 2026. Its brand is synonymous with institutional reliability, corporate trust, and custodial credibility.

But this identity is legible primarily to an aging corporate and institutional constituency. The 25–40 urban retail cohort does not read Zenith's identity as relevant to its daily financial life. The bank's own digital strategy is anchored on retail banking, with Pillar 3 disclosures stating that "the Group continues to strengthen its retail franchise through customer-centric strategies, digital innovation, and financial inclusion". But the installed-base data tells the story: 9% smartphone penetration against OPay's 69%.

2.3 Commitment: Eroding in the Cohort That Defines the Future

Indicator	Reading	Signal
Retail deposits	₦11.56tn — market leader	Strong in absolute terms
App stickiness (25–40)	Functional but not habit-forming	Weak
Digital platform engagement	Functional, not sticky	Weak
Talent retention	Staff costs rising	Under pressure

Commitment is downstream of identity. A new constituency cannot commit to an entity whose self-constitution it cannot read. Zenith's retail commitment base is strong in aggregate — ₦11.56tn in retail deposits is the largest in the market, having grown 9.4% year-on-year — but it is aging. The balances are sticky because the customers are older. The new cohort is not committing.

2.4 Projection: Scaled Beyond Current Validation

Metric	Reading	Signal
Total assets	₦32.01tn	Large
Market capitalisation	₦5tn+ (first Nigerian bank)	Milestone

Metric	Reading	Signal
Regulatory capital	₦614.6bn — highest in Nigeria	Strong
International subsidiaries	Ghana, UK, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire (new), CEMAC (planned)	Expanding
Loan impairments	₦57.57bn (+16.53% YoY)	Rising

Zenith's projection — its structure, reach, market capitalisation, and regulatory footprint — is the largest and most credible in Nigerian banking. But it has been scaled on the assumption that the retail franchise would remain a flow. In the retail constituency, it has become a stock.

2.5 The Competitive Attack on Identity and Commitment

The competitive threat to Zenith is not a balance-sheet threat. Fintechs cannot match Zenith's capital base, its licence, or its corporate relationships. The threat is to the inputs that sustain the franchise — identity and commitment — not the outputs.

Fintechs are building from the bottom up: they start with cheap, high-frequency transactions. They build habit and repeat rate. They accumulate commitment. They build identity ("this is my money app"). And only then do they pursue structure. Zenith holds structure. It is losing commitment in the new cohort. And because commitment cannot be manufactured ahead of identity, the bank cannot simply buy its way back into the retail relationship with marketing spend. The identity itself must be renewed for the new constituency — or the bank must accept that its identity is not renewable for that constituency.

What Conventional Toolkits Miss

Part Two reached a conclusion that conventional analysis would not: a bank with record results faces a structural fork. This part explains, in plain language, why the standard toolkit misses it. The comparison is not a criticism of those tools. It is an account of the question each was built to answer.

1. Conventional methods measure the total. The Strategic Foresight Protocol measures the parts.

Conventional: Retail deposits grew 9.4% to ₦11.56tn. That's healthy.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: Who holds those deposits? If the growth is coming from people in their fifties and sixties while thirty-year-olds bank elsewhere, the total is rising while the foundation is shrinking.

The blind spot: A total can grow for years while its composition quietly deteriorates. The aggregate tells you the franchise is bigger. It does not tell you the franchise is older.

2. Conventional methods look backward. The Strategic Foresight Protocol looks forward.

Conventional: Full-year results, quarterly earnings, year-on-year comparisons. All of it describes what already happened.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: The question is not what the bank earned last year. It is whether the customers who will hold the money in 2040 are opening accounts today.

The blind spot: Backward-looking data confirms a problem only after it has already happened. By the time the earnings show the decline, the customers are gone.

3. Conventional methods compare you to your peers. The Strategic Foresight Protocol compares you to whoever the customer actually chooses.

Conventional: Zenith versus GTCO, Access, UBA, FirstBank. Against that set, Zenith looks strong.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: The relevant competitor for a thirty-year-old opening a first account is not another tier-one bank. It is OPay, Moniepoint, PalmPay.

The blind spot: The peer set is defined by industry classification, not customer behaviour. You can lead your peer group while losing the market that matters.

4. Conventional methods track what is on the books. The Strategic Foresight Protocol tracks what never appears on the books.

Conventional: Assets, liabilities, capital, provisions, goodwill from acquisitions.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: Brand, trust, depositor relationships, corporate reputation — all of it built over thirty-six years, all of it expensed as it was built, none of it appearing as an asset.

The blind spot: You cannot see franchise value accumulating, and you cannot see it decaying. It is not on the balance sheet. When it finally shows up in the earnings, the diagnosis is years late.

5. Conventional methods ask whether the bank will survive. The Strategic Foresight Protocol asks whether it will still matter.

Conventional: Capital adequacy, liquidity ratios, stress tests, non-performing loans. All of it asks: can this bank absorb a shock?

Strategic Foresight Protocol: A bank can pass every stress test and still be structurally obsolete. Survival is not relevance.

The blind spot: Nobody owns the question “will this bank still be the preferred choice in fifteen years?” The regulator does not ask it. The auditor does not ask it. The rating agency does not ask it. It falls into the gap between mandates.

6. Conventional methods are comfortable with record results. The Strategic Foresight Protocol is most useful during record results.

Conventional: ~~£~~4.19tn gross earnings, ~~£~~1.04tn profit, ~~£~~5tn market capitalisation, dividend doubled. Every headline says the bank is winning.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: This is exactly when structural decay is hardest to see and most important to catch. Good numbers create a prior that nothing is wrong.

The blind spot: Diagnosing a structural problem during a record year looks like arguing with the evidence. Management does not want to hear it. The Board does not want to hear it. The market does not want to hear it. So the window closes while everyone is celebrating.

7. Conventional methods each own a piece of the question. The Strategic Foresight Protocol owns the whole question.

Conventional: The auditor asks if the statements are accurate. The regulator asks if the bank is safe. The rating agency asks if the debt will be repaid. The analyst asks if next year’s estimate will be beaten. The Board asks if the bank is compliant and stable.

Strategic Foresight Protocol: None of those questions, added together, asks whether the bank is positioned where its advantages are durable.

The blind spot: Every institution measures the bank against the last reported period and the prevailing rules. The question that actually matters — is this bank built for the market it now competes in? — has no institutional owner. That is why the diagnosis is missed. Not because the tools are weak. Because the question falls between them.

The short version: Conventional methods tell you how well the bank is running the business it has. The Strategic Foresight Protocol asks whether that business will still exist in its current form. Both questions are legitimate. Only one of them was being asked.

The Management Transition — The Pivotal Event

4.1 What Happened

On 5 May 2026, Zenith Bank announced that founder and Group Chairman Jim Ovia had retired, having completed the mandatory 12-year tenure permitted under Nigerian banking governance regulations for chairmen of financial holding companies. The Board appointed Mustafa Bello as his successor, with the approval of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Bello joined the Board in December 2017 and was its longest-serving director. His career spans engineering, government, and investment promotion. He graduated in civil engineering from Ahmadu Bello University in 1978 with a second-class upper division, receiving the Shell prize for the best engineering project and thesis. He served in the Nigerian Army's engineering directorate and the Niger State Housing Corporation before moving into public service. From 1999 to 2002, he was Nigeria's Minister of Commerce under President Olusegun Obasanjo. He then headed the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission from 2003 to 2014 as executive secretary and director-general, overseeing policies aimed at attracting investment into the country. He currently chairs Invest-in-Northern Nigeria Limited, a vehicle focused on economic development across the northern region.

4.2 Why This Matters Economically

The appointment is not merely a governance formality. It is a declaration of strategic direction.

Bello's profile is institutional, governmental, and policy-oriented. He has spent his career in public service, investment promotion, and infrastructure-adjacent economic development. He is not a retail banker. He is not a technology executive. He is not a consumer fintech operator. He is an institutional figure with deep experience in government relations, regulatory engagement, and large-scale investment facilitation.

This profile maps directly onto Zenith's wholesale banking franchise — corporate lending, sovereign and infrastructure finance, trade finance, custody, and investment banking. Bello's experience in commerce ministry, investment promotion, and northern Nigeria economic development positions him well to govern a bank that is concentrating its capital on large-scale corporate, sovereign, and infrastructure lending.

It does not map onto retail fintech competition. Building a consumer challenger to OPay, Moniepoint, and PalmPay requires a cultural authority comfortable with digital-first decision-making, tolerance for experimentation, rapid product iteration, and the ability to attract and retain fintech talent. The current Board composition is not that authority.

4.3 The Governance Signal

The Board appointed an institutional figure. The CBN approved the appointment. The signal is clear: the governance layer is constituted for institutional discipline, regulatory compliance, and structural oversight — not for retail innovation or consumer fintech execution.

This does not make a retail renewal impossible. But it makes it authority-mismatched. A retail renewal requires a governance layer that the Board has not chosen. This is not a criticism of Bello. It is an observation about what his appointment means for strategic execution.

4.4 The Transition as the Action Window

The transition itself is the action window. Founder-led institutions carry a specific liability: the founder's identity is fused with the institution's identity. Jim Ovia built Zenith. His conservatism, his institutional discipline, and his long-term orientation are embedded in the bank's DNA. As long as he remained chairman, the bank's strategic direction was anchored to his legacy.

His retirement creates a genuine decision point. The new chairman has a mandate to govern, not merely to preserve. And his background — commerce ministry, investment promotion, infrastructure — points toward a specific trajectory: concentration on wholesale banking, not retail renewal.

The transition is the moment when the structural question can be answered. Once the new chairman's tenure is established and the strategic direction is set, the window for a major structural pivot narrows. The time to decide is now.

The Three Trajectories

Three paths are open to Zenith. Each is economically coherent, and each is set out below with its logic, its costs, its expected outcome, its probability of success, and its governance alignment.

Trajectory 1 — Continue as Is

Description: Maintain the current universal banking model. Continue investing in retail digital capabilities at the current pace. Defend the deposit franchise. Grow the corporate and investment banking business organically. Manage regulatory compliance. Let the market determine the outcome.

Economic logic: The retail franchise is still profitable. Deposits are the cheapest funding source. Exiting or radically restructuring retail would sacrifice the funding floor that subsidises the corporate lending book. The fintech challenge is real but may prove cyclical rather than structural — a funding-winter-driven pause in a longer growth trajectory. Zenith’s conservatism has served it well through every prior crisis; there is no reason to abandon it now.

Costs and tradeoffs:

Cost category	Description	Magnitude
Opportunity cost	Capital and management attention continue flowing to a business with no durable competitive advantage	Significant
Terminal value erosion	Retail deposit franchise ages; sticky current accounts gradually shift to rate-sensitive term deposits; cheap-funding subsidy shrinks	Slow but compounding
Competitive irreversibility	If the 25–40 cohort is permanently captured by fintechs, re-entry becomes prohibitively expensive	High
Talent drain	Digital talent continues migrating to fintechs and technology companies	Ongoing
Multiple compression	Market continues applying universal-bank multiple with retail drag embedded	Moderate

Expected outcome: Zenith remains a top-three Nigerian bank by profitability and stability over the next decade. It does not define the consumer financial experience for the next 100 million Nigerians entering the formal economy. That mantle shifts elsewhere. The bank becomes a corporate and institutional franchise with a legacy retail deposit base — profitable, stable, but structurally incomplete.

Probability of success: High near-term (5–7 years), declining thereafter.

Governance alignment: High. The institutional chairman and conservative board culture are well-suited to Trajectory 1. It requires no major strategic pivot, no cultural disruption, and no political capital expenditure.

Trajectory 2 — Renew Retail Identity, Build Commitment

Description: Accept that retail relevance requires fundamental identity renewal. Invest in a separate digital-first brand with independent leadership, incentives, and technology stack. Use the existing fintech subsidiary as the vehicle, or acquire an existing fintech to accelerate. Build commitment with the 25–40 cohort through daily-use products, superior user experience, and agent-network expansion. Defend the retail deposit franchise as the funding floor for the corporate book.

Economic logic: Retail banking is not a declining business. It is a business where Zenith currently lacks the operating model to compete. The market is large, underpenetrated, and growing. Nigeria’s consumer lending market is a 10x growth opportunity: banks hold 65% of the country’s \$27 billion loan portfolio, but just 8% of bank lending is focused on consumers. Payroll lending is the most reliable form of consumer credit. Zenith’s existing corporate relationships — payroll infrastructure, corporate banking spillover — provide a natural customer acquisition channel that fintechs cannot replicate.

Costs and tradeoffs:

Cost category	Description	Magnitude
Capital investment	Technology stack overhaul, separate brand build, talent acquisition	High (N50–100bn+ over 3–5 years)
Cultural disruption	Requires relinquishing founder-led decision-making; empowering independent leadership	High
Time	3–6 years to build a credible retail challenger	Significant
Execution risk	Bank-led fintech ventures have a poor track record in Nigeria	High
Cannibalisation risk	A separate digital brand may cannibalise the existing retail franchise rather than expand it	Moderate

Expected outcome: If successful, Zenith builds a genuine retail challenger that captures the 25–40 cohort, renews the retail deposit franchise, and positions the bank for long-term relevance. If unsuccessful, the bank has spent significant capital and management attention on a business it cannot win, while the core corporate franchise underperforms.

Probability of success: Moderate to low. The track record of Nigerian banks building consumer fintech challengers is poor. The cultural and governance preconditions are demanding. The current chairman’s institutional profile and the founder’s conservative legacy are constraints, not enablers.

Governance alignment: Low. Trajectory 2 requires a cultural authority comfortable with retail innovation, digital-first decision-making, and tolerance for experimentation. The current Board composition is not that authority. Trajectory 2 is economically coherent but governance-blocked.

Trajectory 3 — Exit Retail, Concentrate on Corporate, Sovereign, and Investment Banking

Description: Separate or sell the retail banking franchise. Redeploy the proceeds and released regulatory capital into corporate, sovereign, and investment banking — the businesses where Zenith’s

identity, commitment, and structural advantages are strongest. Lock the corporate identity: institutional discipline, credit underwriting, custodial reliability, sovereign relationships. Build deeper commitment with corporate, institutional, and sovereign counterparties.

Economic logic: This is a capital allocation decision, not a retreat. The bank would be converting a low-return, high-competition business (retail banking under fintech pressure) into capital that can be deployed to higher-return, lower-competition businesses (corporate lending, infrastructure finance, trade finance, custody). The returns on equity in corporate and investment banking are higher. The competitive dynamics are more favourable. The capital intensity is lower. And the identity alignment is perfect: Zenith's 36 years of institutional craft, corporate trust, and balance-sheet credibility are precisely what wholesale banking clients value.

The signalling effect: A decisive, well-executed retail exit would sharpen the bank's strategic contrast. It changes the comparable set. Zenith stops being priced against Access and GTCO as a universal bank and starts being priced as a corporate and investment franchise. That is a multiple re-rating produced by a strategic clarity move.

Costs and tradeoffs:

Cost category	Description	Magnitude
Funding cost	Loss of retail current and savings accounts; replacement with more expensive wholesale funding	Moderate (offset by retained corporate and institutional deposits)
Deposit franchise reduction	Retail deposits are a large share of the ₦24.47tn deposit base; separation reduces the funding pool	Significant
Sale valuation	Buyer pool limited; price depends on deposit quality, branch network, licence	Variable
Irreversibility	No re-entry if consumer credit becomes the dominant profit pool in Nigerian banking	High
Regulatory complexity	CBN approval, licence implications, concentration limits	Non-trivial
Execution risk	Separation must be clean; messy exit contaminates the corporate franchise	High
Framing risk	If announced as retreat, damages identity; if announced as focus, reinforces it	Critical

Expected outcome: Zenith becomes Nigeria's premier corporate, sovereign, and investment bank. The balance sheet is smaller but more focused. Returns on equity are higher. The identity is sharper. The bank is positioned for infrastructure finance, sovereign advisory, trade finance, and custody — all markets where it has structural advantages. The market re-rates the entity on a cleaner, more durable earnings profile. The bank is no longer fighting a war it cannot win in retail.

Probability of success: Moderate to high, conditional on execution quality and framing discipline.

Governance alignment: High. The institutional chairman is well-suited to govern a structural reset framed as discipline and focus. The Board’s governance experience — Minister of Commerce, investment promotion, infrastructure — maps directly onto the wholesale banking opportunity.

Comparative Assessment

Dimension	Trajectory 1: Continue as Is	Trajectory 2: Renew Retail	Trajectory 3: Exit Retail
Identity alignment	Moderate	Low	High
Capital efficiency	Low	Low (high investment)	High
Competitive position	Declining	Uncertain	Strengthening
Execution risk	Low	High	Moderate
Governance alignment	High	Low	High
Time to impact	Long (decay)	3–6 years	2–4 years
Terminal value	Eroding	Uncertain	Compounding
Multiple re-rating	No	No	Yes (potential)
Funding floor	Preserved	Preserved	Narrowed
Irreversibility	N/A	Moderate	High

	1 Continue as is	2 Renew retail	3 Exit retail
Identity alignment	Moderate	Low	High
Capital efficiency	Low	Low (high investment)	High
Competitive position	Declining	Uncertain	Strengthening
Execution risk	Low	High	Moderate
Governance alignment	High	Low	High
Time to impact	Long (decay)	3–6 years	2–4 years
Terminal value	Eroding	Uncertain	Compounding
Multiple re-rating	No	No	Yes (potential)
Funding floor	Preserved	Preserved	Narrowed
Irreversibility	N/A	Moderate	High

The same assessment as a heat map. Cell text reproduces the report's ratings; greener indicates a more favourable position, redder a less favourable one.


The Core Tradeoff

The choice is not between good and bad options. It is between stable decay (Trajectory 1), high-risk renewal (Trajectory 2), and governed concentration (Trajectory 3).

Trajectory 1 preserves the funding floor but accepts the erosion of the terminal value. Trajectory 2 attempts to renew the franchise but requires a cultural and governance transformation that the current Board is not constituted to execute. Trajectory 3 concentrates capital where the returns are highest but requires accepting a smaller balance sheet and a narrower market.

The Window

The window for Trajectory 3 is defined by the half-life of the retail franchise. Today, retail deposits are still priced as an asset because the deposit franchise still validates the projection. In five years, if the 25–40 cohort is permanently captured by fintechs, the same retail franchise will be priced on the terminal state of a losing competitive position. Asset values fall when the buyer's market recognises structural decline. The window is not indefinite.



The window: retail is priced as an asset only while the deposit franchise still validates it.

The Governance Question

The choice of trajectory is a governance decision, and the current governance composition is itself a signal.

The Board appointed Mustafa Bello — a former Minister of Commerce, former Director-General of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, and board member since 2017 — as chairman. This is an institutional figure, not a retail or technology figure. The CBN approved the appointment. The signal is clear: the governance layer is constituted for institutional discipline, regulatory compliance, and structural oversight — not for retail innovation or consumer fintech execution.

This does not make Trajectory 2 impossible. But it makes it authority-mismatched. A retail renewal requires a cultural authority comfortable with digital-first decision-making, tolerance for experimentation, and the ability to attract and retain fintech talent. The current Board is not that authority. Trajectory 2 is therefore not merely difficult. It is structurally blocked by the governance layer that the Board itself has chosen.

Trajectory 3, by contrast, is authority-aligned. A structural reset — separating or selling the retail franchise, concentrating on wholesale banking — is precisely the kind of governance act that an institutional chairman is constituted to oversee. It requires regulatory engagement, structural oversight, and disciplined execution — all competencies that the Board possesses.

Recommendation

The structural diagnosis points to Trajectory 3 as the most coherent path — not because it is without risk, but because it is the only trajectory that aligns the bank's capital, identity, and governance with the economic realities of the market it actually competes in.



The six execution conditions.

The execution conditions are non-negotiable:

1. **Governed reset, not ungoverned decay.** The retail separation must be an explicit, Board-authorised structural decision. Carrying retail projection while it decays is the worst outcome: the structural cost is borne without the benefit realised.
2. **Lock the corporate identity.** Codify what is essentially Zenith — institutional discipline, credit underwriting, custodial reliability, corporate trust. This is the invariant that a competitor cannot travel back in time to replicate.
3. **Clean separation.** The separation must be clean. A messy exit leaves residue that contaminates the corporate identity.
4. **Framing discipline.** The announcement must be framed as concentration and focus, not retreat. Retreat-language damages identity. Focus-language reinforces it. Same transaction, opposite effect.
5. **Reinforce before draining.** Strengthen the corporate identity before allowing the retail franchise to drain. Generative feedback before parasitic decay.
6. **Complete the cycle.** One phase contracts — realise retail projection while it is still priced as an asset. Two phases expand — lock corporate identity, build wholesale commitment, scale corporate projection only after the structural integrity is restored.

The bank that is first to exit a muddy field is not the first to retreat. It is the first to understand where its own economics hold.

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Note on data

Financial data are drawn from Zenith Bank’s audited FY 2025 results and unaudited Q1 2026 results as filed with the Nigerian Exchange Group. Market data are sourced from Nairametrics, BusinessDay and other market reporting as cited. Smartphone penetration data are drawn from the KPMG and Orange

Group Nigeria study, as reported by Technext.ng and other outlets. Quotations and figures were synthesised only from publicly available information.