A STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DIAGNOSIS

NIGERIA

Giant on a Downward Spiral

Two Possible Futures, and the Sequence That Decides Between Them

PREPARED FOR

Opposition Parties · The People of Nigeria · The Judiciary · Press and Media

Prepared by Genie Capital Ltd

Framework: Strategic Foresight Protocol

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Executive Summary

Nigeria is not poor. Nigeria is badly organised — and the organisation is getting worse in a way that ordinary economic reporting cannot see.

The country earns large amounts of money. It has vast natural resources, a young and energetic population, a diaspora that sends home more money than almost any other diaspora in the world, and an informal economy that works every day despite the state rather than because of it. Yet the money does not stay, does not multiply, and does not build. More than half of everything the federal government collects goes straight back out the door to pay interest on past borrowing. The currency has two prices, not one. The people have largely stopped expecting the state to help them, and have built their own systems to survive.

This report sets out what is actually happening to Nigeria's economy, why the standard tools — GDP growth, debt-to-GDP, credit ratings, inflation figures — keep missing it, and what the realistic options are from here.

THE CENTRAL FINDING

Nigeria's problem is not mainly the size of its debt, the price of oil, or the level of its exchange rate. The problem is that the state's formal structure — its budget, its borrowing, its institutions — has become disconnected from the two things that actually give an economy its staying power: the credibility of its money and institutions, and the trust of its people. When structure is not backed by credibility and trust, it must be propped up by something else. In Nigeria's case, it is propped up by debt, by oil, and by the patience of citizens who have quietly opted out.

That combination cannot last indefinitely. It can last a long time — Nigeria has been managing it for decades — but it cannot build. And a country that is not building is, slowly, declining.

53.7%
of federal revenue now services debt interest (2026)

₦70
gap between official and street dollar prices

1.3%
of foreign capital inflows went to direct investment, Q1 2026

The report closes with two futures: continue the present course, or change it deliberately. Both are still available. The window is narrowing.

About Genie Capital Ltd

INDEPENDENT IP ORIGINATION & STEWARDSHIP

Genie Capital Ltd is an IP origination and stewardship company based in Buea, Cameroon. In addition to its core mission of IP origination and stewardship, the firm uses its proprietary frameworks to diagnose structural fragilities, market trajectories, and related dynamics — and makes the findings freely available to the public. Genie Capital is not an investment fund, an advisory firm, or a lobbyist.

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A note on method: this edition has been fact-checked and updated against primary sources — the IMF's 2026 Article IV Consultation, the National Bureau of Statistics' Q1 2026 Capital Importation Report, the Central Bank of Nigeria's exchange-rate data, and Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index — current as of September 2026. Figures drawn from official releases are cited in the References section; anything not independently verifiable has been removed or clearly flagged as unverified.


PART I The Diagnosis: Five Numbers That Tell the Real Story

Most commentary on Nigeria's economy focuses on one or two headline figures. Those figures are real, but on their own they mislead. Here are five that, taken together, describe the actual condition.

1. The money moves out faster than it comes in

Nigeria earns heavily from oil, but oil earnings are volatile and, critically, they do not stay in the country as productive capital. In the first half of 2026, despite Brent crude trading well above the budget benchmark of $64.85 a barrel, the government recorded a shortfall in oil revenue — higher prices offset lower volumes but did not create real headroom. Nigerian crude production has also run below the volumes assumed in the 2026 budget.

Worse than the shortfall is where the money goes. Nigeria is not running a current-account crisis in the textbook sense. It is running a capital-account problem: money enters, earns a return, and leaves. Foreign direct investment — the kind that builds factories and hires people — amounted to just $135 million in the first quarter of 2026, about 1.3% of all capital entering the country. Portfolio investment, by contrast, was $9.86 billion, roughly 95% of the total. Of that portfolio money, the banking sector alone absorbed $7.55 billion — about 73% of everything that came in — while production and manufacturing received $152 million, or under 1.5%.






Figure 1–2 — National Bureau of Statistics, Capital Importation Report, Q1 2026.

> *Almost all the foreign money coming into Nigeria is going into financial intermediation and yield, not into production. That is the definition of an economy being used rather than built.*

2. Nigeria's money has two prices, not one

The naira trades at roughly ₦1,320–₦1,335 to the dollar at the official window and around ₦1,375–₦1,395 on the parallel market — a gap of roughly ₦60–₦70, or about 4–5%. The spread has narrowed somewhat since the 2023 float, aided by stronger reserves, but it has not closed.




Figure 3 — Central Bank of Nigeria (NFEM) and parallel-market dealer quotes, early September 2026.

A persistent two-tier exchange rate is not a technical glitch. It means the official price of the currency is not the price people actually pay, and therefore not the price anyone fully believes. When a currency has one price for the state and a different price for everyone else, it stops functioning as money in the ordinary sense. It becomes two things: an accounting unit for government and creditors, and a survival instrument for citizens.

This matters far beyond import costs. Money is a public institution, like courts or roads. When it is not trusted, everything priced in it becomes uncertain — wages, savings, contracts, pensions. Uncertainty is a tax on every transaction, and it is paid by everyone, but hardest by the poor.

3. Trust in formal institutions has eroded — and the people have responded

Nigeria ranks 142nd out of 182 countries on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 26 out of 100 — unchanged from 2024, but two places lower because other countries moved. Nigeria sits in a group tied for 142nd alongside Cameroon, Guatemala, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan and Papua New Guinea, and behind 33 other African countries. Transparency International's Nigerian chapter has acknowledged genuine progress on asset recovery in the same period, even as the headline score stagnates.




Figure 4 — Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 (released February 2026).

The public's response has not been mass protest. It has been withdrawal.

More than nine in ten of Nigeria's active workforce operate in the informal sector, and independent estimates put the informal economy's contribution to GDP at well over half. Traders, artisans, mechanics, domestic workers, transport operators, small manufacturers, vendors — this is not a

marginal sector. It is the country's actual operating system. It has grown precisely because the formal system cannot be relied upon: not for credit, not for contracts, not for protection, not for dispute resolution.





Figure 5 — ILO / World Economics informal-sector estimates; World Bank financial-sector data.

This is not a story about laziness or tax evasion. It is a story about rational behaviour in the presence of a broken social contract. People did not leave the formal economy. The formal economy left them.

4. More than half of government revenue goes to interest payments

This is arguably the single most important number in Nigeria's economic story.



The International Monetary Fund's 2026 Article IV Consultation projects that interest payments will consume 53.7% of federal government revenue in 2026 — up from 53.2% in 2025 and 40.8% in 2024, before easing only marginally to 52.4% in 2027. The IMF's Resident Representative for Nigeria, Christian Ebeke, has been direct about the implication: when more than half of tax collection goes to interest, very little room remains to fund health, education, cash transfers, or security.

Gross public debt is around the mid-30s percent of GDP — a figure the IMF itself describes as sustainable, and low compared with many peers. That description is technically correct and practically incomplete. A household earning ₦100,000 a month with a large mortgage is not in trouble because the loan is large relative to lifetime earnings; it is in trouble because the monthly payment eats half the salary. Nigeria's debt-to-GDP ratio is comfortable. Nigeria's debt-to-revenue ratio is a genuine constraint on the state's ability to function.

Nigeria's federal fiscal deficit has also widened sharply over the past decade, a trend consistent with a widening revenue base problem rather than a purely cyclical one — the country's core fiscal challenge is not how much it owes, but how little it collects relative to the size of its economy and how much of what it does collect is pre-committed to interest.

5. Credit does not reach the economy

Private-sector credit in Nigeria stands at roughly one-fifth of GDP, below the sub-Saharan African average of around a third, and far below peer emerging markets. An economy where businesses cannot borrow easily is an economy where businesses cannot grow, cannot invest at scale, and cannot compete with imports.

Meanwhile, the government's own borrowing needs compete with private borrowers for the same pool of funds. When the state absorbs more than half its revenue servicing interest, and domestic banks can

earn safe, attractive returns on government paper, there is comparatively little incentive to lend to a small manufacturer or a growing services firm. The financial system is functioning — it is simply functioning for a different purpose than broad-based productive lending.

PART II The Central Imbalance


Put the five numbers together and a clear picture emerges.

Nigeria's formal structure — the budget, the debt, the ministries, the state apparatus — is large and visible. But it is not supported by the two things that make a structure durable over time: credible institutions (money that holds its value, courts that rule predictably, contracts that are enforced) and public trust (the belief among citizens that the system is fair enough to participate in).

When structure is not supported by credibility and trust, it must be financed by something else. Nigeria finances it with three things:

- Oil revenue, which is volatile and externally determined.
- Debt, which must be serviced, and which now consumes the majority of revenue.
- Citizen patience, expressed as mass participation in an informal economy that the state does not tax and does not serve.

None of these three can build a modern economy on its own. Oil is a windfall, not a foundation. Debt is a claim on the future. And an informal economy, however energetic, cannot finance public goods at scale because it is not connected to the public system.



Structure without credibility and trust must be propped up — and what props it up cannot build.

This is why Nigeria can look stable on paper while quietly deteriorating in practice. The structure persists. The foundation erodes.

PART III Why Conventional Tools Miss This

Standard economic analysis — the kind used by rating agencies, multilateral institutions, and most financial press — measures size. GDP, debt-to-GDP, inflation, reserves, market capitalisation. These are magnitudes. They tell you how much.

They do not tell you direction. And direction is where Nigeria's story actually lives.

Seven specific blind spots stand out.

1 — SIZE HIDES COMPOSITION

Two countries can post identical GDP growth with completely different economic health. One grows because firms are investing, hiring, and exporting. The other grows because oil prices rose or because government spending rose. GDP records both as the same number; it cannot see what is underneath. Nigeria's headline growth in 2026 is respectable. Underneath it, foreign direct investment is roughly 1% of capital inflows, credit to the private sector sits below the regional average, and interest payments consume more than half of federal revenue. The growth figure is real. It is simply not the figure that matters most.

2 — ORDER MATTERS

Conventional models tend to assume that the sequence in which policies are implemented matters less than the policies themselves. In reality, sequence is often decisive.

Nigeria floated the naira in 2023, presented at the time as a necessary correction. But a currency float works best when it follows a credible institutional framework — a central bank the public trusts, a fiscal position that is not already over-committed, a domestic productive base able to respond to a cheaper currency by exporting more. Much of that foundation was still being built when the float occurred, which is one reason the parallel-market gap persisted well after unification rather than closing immediately.

A similar pattern is visible in the structural adjustment programme of the 1980s: reforms were applied to an economy that had not yet built the institutions to absorb them, and the result was a difficult adjustment followed by an extended period of contraction. The recurring lesson is not that reform is wrong, but that reform applied in the wrong order tends to fail on its own terms.

3 — SYSTEMS DO NOT SIMPLY BOUNCE BACK

Standard economic models often assume that after a shock, an economy reverts to its prior trend. Institutional trust does not reliably work that way. A country that endures a period of currency instability, capital flight, and visible corruption does not automatically return to where it was once conditions improve; it carries the memory. Citizens who lost savings in a devaluation do not forget quickly. Businesses that closed do not automatically reopen. The damage compounds rather than simply cycling.

4 — THERE IS NO LINE ITEM FOR LOST TRUST

A country's balance sheet records debt, reserves, and assets. It does not record eroded trust, weakened institutions, or the accumulated cost of citizens opting out of the formal system. But these are real

liabilities with measurable economic consequences: higher transaction costs, lower investment, weaker tax compliance, more capital flight, more emigration of skilled workers. Because there is no line for them, they tend not to be actively managed — and what is not managed tends to compound.

5 — LEADERSHIP IS TREATED AS COMMENTARY, NOT AS ECONOMICS

In standard analysis, political leadership is often confined to the qualitative sections of reports and excluded from the economic model itself. This understates its role. Institutional credibility — the confidence that rules will be applied consistently — lowers the risk premium attached to everything a country does; the absence of that credibility raises it. The difference shows up in borrowing costs, currency stability, and whether people keep their money at home or move it abroad.

6 — COMPETITION IS ABOUT MORE THAN MARKET SHARE

Standard competitive analysis treats economics largely as a contest over fixed market shares. In practice, particularly for developing economies, a country's economic position is also shaped by whose definitions of "sound policy" prevail — definitions set in part through decades of engagement with external creditors and advisors. When a country's own account of its interests is displaced by an externally set definition, the effects surface later, in the numbers themselves.

7 — THE DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS ARE NOT NEUTRAL

When the IMF publishes an Article IV assessment, when a rating agency issues a sovereign opinion, when the World Bank publishes a governance indicator, these are not passive observations. They influence borrowing costs, investor sentiment, and domestic policy debate. This does not mean the analysis is wrong — the IMF's own warnings about Nigeria's debt-service ratio, cited throughout this report, are a case in point of useful diagnosis. It means the analysis is consequential in ways the analysis itself does not fully account for.

PART IV The External Dimension

Nigeria's economic condition is sometimes discussed as though it were entirely self-inflicted. That is not accurate, and this report will not pretend otherwise. But it is equally inaccurate to describe it as entirely imposed from outside. The record is mixed, and it is worth being precise about which parts of it are well documented and which are not.

WHAT IS WELL DOCUMENTED

The structural adjustment programme of the 1980s was, on the public record, introduced as a precondition for Nigeria's continued access to World Bank and IMF financing. Its broad design and conditionalities were shaped externally. The reforms were real, and so was the deterioration that followed: Nigeria's formal manufacturing base contracted, the currency was repeatedly devalued, and external debt expanded rather than shrank in the years afterward. This is documented economic history, not interpretation, and it illustrates a genuine and recurring dynamic — that Nigeria's policy space has, at various points, been shaped as much by the terms attached to external financing as by domestic choices.

More recently, IMF surveillance has functioned differently: the Fund's 2026 Article IV Consultation, cited throughout this report, is advisory rather than conditional — Nigeria carries no outstanding IMF loan balance as of mid-2026, having repaid its 2020 pandemic-era emergency facility on schedule in April 2025. The debt-service pressure the IMF is warning about is therefore a product of Nigeria's own domestic and external commercial borrowing, not of Fund lending itself.

A SEPARATE MATTER THAT HAS DRAWN PUBLIC ATTENTION

A different and unrelated issue has been the subject of extensive Nigerian and international reporting in 2025 and 2026: a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, brought in 2023 by the transparency activist Aaron Greenspan against several US federal agencies. The suit seeks records connected to a Chicago heroin-trafficking investigation from the early 1990s, in which President Bola Tinubu — then a private citizen — was named alongside three other individuals, along with records from a related 1993 civil forfeiture proceeding involving roughly $460,000.

Several of the named agencies — including the CIA, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the IRS — have been granted summary judgment in the case, removing them from the dispute; the CIA's position was that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of responsive records, a standard law-enforcement posture known as a Glomar response, which the court sustained. The FBI and DEA remain under order to search for and process non-exempt records, and Tinubu, who joined the litigation as an intervenor, has separately asked the court to preserve redactions on personal-privacy grounds under FOIA's law-enforcement exemption.

The Nigerian Presidency has publicly clarified that the matter is a civil records-disclosure dispute, not a criminal proceeding, and that no US court has made any finding of wrongdoing against the President. It has also pointed to a 2003 letter from the US Consulate in Lagos to Nigeria's then Inspector-General of Police stating that an FBI records check had found no criminal arrest records, wants, or warrants for Tinubu.

This report draws one narrow conclusion from that case, and no more: it is a live illustration of how much of the historical record concerning Nigeria's political class continues to sit in foreign court files and foreign agency archives rather than in Nigerian institutions, and how much effort it takes — even for a determined private citizen using a foreign country's own transparency law — to bring any of it into public view. That is a comment on the weakness of Nigeria's own institutional record-keeping and disclosure culture, not evidence of any present operational relationship between the Nigerian state and a foreign intelligence service. This report does not make that claim, and readers should be wary of anyone who cites this case to support it.

WHAT THIS MEANS STRUCTURALLY


The honest distinction is between cause and amplification. External pressure did not create Nigeria's dependence on oil, its informal economy, its corruption, or its weak courts — those are domestic in origin. But external financing terms, and the country's chronic reliance on foreign capital to cover the gap between what it earns and what it spends, have repeatedly amplified those domestic weaknesses and narrowed the range of policy choices available to any Nigerian government, of any party.

That is not a counsel of grievance. It is a counsel of realism: a country whose currency, budget, and borrowing depend heavily on how outside creditors and markets view it has less room to set its own terms than one that does not. Rebuilding that room is itself a domestic task — it depends on the sequence described in Part V, not on external actors changing their behaviour.

PART V

Two Futures

Nigeria has two broad paths available. Both are real. Neither is guaranteed.



Path One — Continue the Present Course

On this path, nothing fundamental changes.

- Debt service stays above 50% of federal revenue, and probably rises.
- The naira remains split between official and parallel rates.
- Oil revenue remains volatile and externally determined.
- Foreign capital continues to flow mostly into financial assets rather than production.
- The informal economy continues to absorb the majority of workers and of economic activity.
- Corruption continues, with occasional visible prosecutions and few convictions.

Nigeria will not collapse. Countries with large populations, informal economies, and natural resources can persist in this state for a very long time. But it will not build. Over time, the structure will erode relative to the rest of the world: education will fall further behind, infrastructure will degrade faster than it is replaced, skilled workers will continue to leave, and the country's position in global value chains will remain that of a supplier of raw materials and a consumer of finished goods.

> *This is not stability. It is administratively orderly decline.*

Path Two — Deliberate Structural Change

On this path, Nigeria changes the order of its priorities. It stops trying to fix the visible structure — the debt, the budget, the exchange rate — before fixing what supports it.

The change is not primarily about policy design. Nigeria has no shortage of policy documents. The change is about sequence.

THE CORRECT SEQUENCE

1. Restore the credibility of money and institutions first. A single, honest exchange rate. Courts that resolve commercial disputes in months rather than years. Contracts that are enforced. Procurement that is published. This is not about morality; it is about making money work again, because every other economic activity depends on it.
2. Then rebuild trust with the people. The informal economy is not a problem to be formalised and taxed — it is the country's largest untapped productive asset. If it had access to working capital at reasonable rates, without requiring connections, it would generate employment, output, and eventually tax revenue. But capital will only flow into the informal economy if there is a credible system to lend through, which requires step one.
3. Only then scale the formal structure. Once money is credible and trust is rebuilding, the state can borrow sensibly, invest in infrastructure, and expand public services. Attempting this before steps one and two reproduces the current situation: a formal structure financed by debt, disconnected from the economy it is meant to serve.

THE SEQUENCE IS NOT OPTIONAL

This is the single most important point in this report. Nigeria's major reform episodes have tended to fail on sequence, not on design. Structural adjustment struggled because liberalisation was applied before institutions were built to absorb it. The 2023 currency float struggled to close the parallel-market gap because market pricing was introduced before monetary credibility was fully in place. Fuel subsidy removal caused acute social strain because compensating mechanisms — targeted cash transfers, transport subsidies — were designed but not yet fully operational when the subsidy ended.

The reforms were not, in most cases, wrong ideas. They were applied in a sequence that a still-fragile institutional base could not absorb.

> *The correct order is: credibility, then trust, then scale. Not the reverse.*

WHAT THIS REQUIRES IN PRACTICE

- A single exchange rate, honestly maintained, with the central bank's independence visible and real.
- Commercial courts that function, with published timelines, published judgments, and consequences for non-compliance.
- Transparency in public procurement, published in real time, at a level of detail that allows the press and civil society to audit.
- Working capital for the informal economy, delivered through institutions the informal economy already trusts, not solely through formal banks that have rarely served it.
- A fiscal rule that caps debt service as a share of revenue, so the structural imbalance cannot silently re-establish itself.

None of this is exotic. These are the basic preconditions for any economy to function. The demanding part is doing them in the right order — and doing them at all.

PART VI What This Means for Each Audience

For Opposition Parties

There is a structural advantage that has not been fully used: the government's economic record can be assessed on numbers it publishes itself. Argue about sequence and results, not ideology. Ask, publicly and repeatedly:

- Why does more than half of federal revenue go to interest payments, and what is the plan to change that?
- Why does the naira have two prices, and which price does the government use when it calculates its own budget?
- Why was foreign direct investment roughly 1% of capital inflows in Q1 2026, while portfolio investment was over 95%?
- Why is private-sector credit below the sub-Saharan African average?
- Why are convictions in corruption cases so rare relative to the number of cases opened?

These are arithmetic questions, not partisan ones. The government can answer them or decline to. Both responses are politically informative. The strongest position available to any opposition party in Nigeria today is not a competing economic programme — it is demanding transparency on the existing one.

For the Supreme Court and the Judiciary

The judiciary's role in Nigeria's economic recovery is structural rather than political. Two things determine whether an economy can grow: whether contracts are enforced, and whether public money is accounted for. Both are judicial functions.

- Commercial dispute resolution timelines: if a business dispute takes years to resolve, credit will not flow. Published, enforced timelines for commercial cases would do more for private-sector credit than any single central-bank policy.
- Public accountability: corruption cases that drag on for years teach the public that the system is not serious, regardless of intent. The judiciary can set expectations for how such cases proceed.
- Review of opaque arrangements: where public contracts or state obligations are shielded from scrutiny, the judiciary is often the only institution with standing to require disclosure.

An economy cannot be built on contracts that are not enforced or money that is not accounted for. That is not only a legal observation — it is an economic one.

For the Press and Media

The press is the institution best placed to make the structural picture visible at scale. The most useful journalism right now is not political commentary — it is routine, disciplined reporting on specific, verifiable numbers, published consistently:

- The quarterly debt-service figure as a share of revenue.
- The gap between the official and parallel exchange rates.

- The sectoral breakdown of capital importation — how much goes to banking versus manufacturing.
- The disposition of specific corruption cases: filed, charged, tried, decided, appealed.
- The composition of the federal budget: debt service, capital expenditure, recurrent spending.

Individually, each story is dry. Published consistently, over a year, they become an incontrovertible record that changes the political conversation. Numbers repeated with discipline are difficult to deny.

For the People

Much of this is already lived experience rather than news. The official exchange rate is not the price most people pay. Borrowing money without connections is difficult. A court case can outlast the dispute it was meant to resolve. The informal systems people rely on — the trader's credit, the market association's dispute resolution, the family network's capital — work because people built them, not because the formal system provided them.

What this report adds is confirmation that the situation is structural and documented rather than a personal failure or simply bad luck. The numbers exist. The pattern is visible. The government publishes the figures that show the problem.

The informal economy is not evidence that Nigerians cannot build. It is evidence that they build despite the formal system. The open question is what becomes possible if that energy is ever connected to a system that works for it rather than around it.

The Choice

Nigeria is not in crisis. That is precisely the danger.

Crisis forces action. Comfort allows drift. Nigeria's condition is comfortable enough at the top to avoid urgency, and painful enough at the bottom to be endured rather than confronted. This is a difficult configuration, because it can persist for decades while the country's relative position in the world quietly declines.

The path described in this report is not radical. It asks for credible money, functioning courts, transparent procurement, capital for the informal economy, and a limit on how much revenue can go to interest. These are the preconditions of any functioning economy — in fact, what most successful economies already have in place.

The demanding part is sequence. Nigeria has repeatedly attempted reform in a different order than the one that tends to work elsewhere. Credibility comes before trust. Trust comes before scale. Attempting scale without the foundations produces what Nigeria has today: a large structure resting on borrowed money and citizen patience.

The mathematics is straightforward. The sequence is straightforward. The question is whether the institutions capable of acting — the opposition, the judiciary, the press, and the public — will demand it before the window closes.

> *The best time to plant a tree was twenty years ago. The second best time is now.*

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This edition draws on published data current as of September 2026. Each figure below has been checked against a primary or major-outlet source.

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INFORMAL ECONOMY AND PRIVATE CREDIT

- International Labour Organization and World Economics — informal-sector employment and GDP-contribution estimates for Nigeria (cited as estimates; ranges vary by methodology and should be treated as indicative rather than precise)
- World Bank financial-sector data — private-sector credit as a share of GDP, Nigeria versus sub-Saharan African average

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

- World Bank / IMF public record on the conditionality attached to Nigeria's 1980s Structural Adjustment Programme

THE US FOIA LITIGATION REFERENCED IN PART IV

- TheCable, "US court orders FBI, DEA to release records on Tinubu's investigation" — summary judgment rulings, April 2025
- TheCable, "Tinubu asks US court to block release of FBI, DEA records on him, cites privacy rights" — August 2026
- TheNigeriaLawyer, "It Is Not A Criminal Case Against President Tinubu" — Presidency's clarification via Special Adviser Bayo Onanuga, September 2026

– United States District Court for the District of Columbia — Civil Action No. 23-1816 (Greenspan v. CIA et al.), as reported in Nigerian and international media, 2023–2026

Full source citations and underlying data are available on request from Genie Capital Ltd.

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