



Genie Capital

STRUCTURAL DIAGNOSIS • STRATEGIC BLUEPRINT

The Gambia: Structural Diagnosis and Blueprint

A Comprehensive Analysis and Strategic Framework

Genie Capital Ltd • October 2026



ABOUT THIS REPORT

The Gambia: Structural Diagnosis and Blueprint

PREPARED FOR	Regulators, Policymakers, Investors, Executives, Development Partners, Media and the People
PREPARED BY	Genie Capital Ltd
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How to Read This Report

The report follows a single narrative arc: from the past that shaped the country, to the structure it has today, to why that structure has been misread, to what should be built, and finally how to build it.

PART I	Where did the country come from?	A river corridor, a colonial boundary and an extractive inheritance.
PART II	Where does the structure break?	An overextended state, a thin productive base and a weak energy and skills foundation.
PART III	Why has the standard prescription failed?	It treats a corridor economy as a generic small economy.
PART IV	What should be built?	Deep education, a stable currency, firm power, a river corridor, tool making and logistics.
PART V	How is it done?	Constraints, budgets, a phased 25-year sequence and a control loop.

PART I

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

Where did the country come from, and what did it inherit?

1. The Precolonial Era: The River as Corridor

The Gambia River has been a corridor of trade, power, and cultural exchange for over a millennium before European contact. Its navigability for approximately 240 kilometres inland made it a natural artery connecting the Atlantic coast to the interior of West Africa.




Figure 1. Milestones that shaped the Gambian river corridor

1.1 The Sudanic Empires

From the 10th to 16th centuries, the region that is now The Gambia fell under the influence of the great Sudanic empires. The Empire of Ghana, centred in what is now Mali and Mauritania, controlled trans-Saharan trade routes that connected West Africa to North Africa and the Mediterranean. Gold, salt, and slaves moved north; horses, cloth, and manufactured goods moved south.

The Empire of Mali, which rose in the 13th century, extended its influence over the Gambia River valley. Mali's wealth was built on gold from the Bambuk and Bure fields, and its control of the trans-Saharan trade routes. The river was a conduit for this trade—not a border, not a barrier, but a highway.

The Songhai Empire, which succeeded Mali in the 15th century, continued this pattern. The river valley was integrated into a vast network that stretched from the Atlantic to the Niger River, from the Sahel to the forest zone.



1.2 The Arrival of Europeans

Portuguese explorer Alvise Cadamosto reached the Gambia River in 1455. By the late 15th century, Portuguese traders had established contact with the riverine peoples. Their initial interest was gold, but the Atlantic slave trade soon became the dominant economic activity.

The English established their first trading factory on the Gambia River in 1618. In 1664, the United Kingdom formally established a colony focused on exporting enslaved people across the Atlantic. The Royal African Company, chartered in 1672, held a monopoly on English trade in the region.

The river became a corridor for human cargo. Forts and trading posts—James Island, Albreda, Fort Bullen—were established along its banks. The trade routes that had once carried gold and salt now carried captured Africans to the Americas.

1.3 The Colonial Scramble and the 1893 Settlement

The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 formalised the scramble for Africa. Britain and France competed for territory in West Africa. Britain wanted the Gambia River; France wanted the surrounding territory.

The 1893 settlement drew the boundaries that persist today. Britain claimed a narrow strip along two hundred miles of the lower Gambia River—approximately 10,000 square kilometres—surrounded entirely by French Senegal. This geography was not a natural outcome. It was a colonial artifact.

The colony was administered from Bathurst (now Banjul), at the mouth of the river. The economy was extractive: groundnuts for export, no industrial development, minimal infrastructure beyond what served the extraction of raw materials. The river—the country's greatest natural asset—was used to move groundnuts to the port, not to build industry.

1.4 The Structural Inheritance

By independence in 1965, The Gambia had inherited:

- **A river corridor with no industrial base.** The river was a transport artery for raw materials, not a foundation for manufacturing.
- A common-law legal system surrounded by civil-law neighbours. English common law was a differentiator, but it had not been exploited for commercial advantage.
- An economy designed for extraction rather than transformation. Groundnuts, tourism, and re-exports were the pillars. Manufacturing was negligible.
- **A narrow, elongated territory.** The country is approximately 400 kilometres long and 50 kilometres wide at its widest point—a sliver embedded in Senegal.
- **A small population.** Approximately 350,000 at independence, growing to 2.9 million today.

These structural facts have shaped the country's development trajectory for six decades.

2. Independence and the Jawara Era (1965–1994)

2.1 The First Republic

Sir Dawda Jawara became the first Prime Minister of The Gambia in 1965. The country became a republic in 1970, with Jawara as President. His rule lasted until 1994—29 years.

The Jawara era was characterised by:

- **Political stability.** The Gambia was one of the few African countries to avoid coups and civil war during this period.
- **Economic dependence.** Groundnuts remained the dominant export. Tourism began to develop in the 1970s and 1980s. Re-exports to Senegal and Mali grew.
- **Liberal economic policy.** The country was open to trade and investment. The dalasi was pegged first to the pound sterling, then to the dollar.
- **Structural adjustment.** In 1985, The Gambia adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme under pressure from the IMF and World Bank. The dalasi was devalued, the exchange rate was liberalised, and state enterprises were privatised.
- **The 1981 coup attempt.** A failed coup attempt in 1981 led to Senegalese intervention and the creation of the Senegambia Confederation (1982–1989), a failed attempt at integration with Senegal.

By the early 1990s, the economy was stagnant. Groundnut prices were volatile. Tourism was seasonal. Public debt was growing. The state was overextended.

2.2 The 1994 Coup

In July 1994, a military coup led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh overthrew Jawara. The coup was initially welcomed by many Gambians who were frustrated with the stagnation of the Jawara era. The international community condemned it, and sanctions were imposed.

3. The Jammeh Era (1994–2017)

3.1 Political Repression and Economic Stagnation

Yahya Jammeh ruled The Gambia for 22 years. His regime was characterised by:

- **Political repression.** Human rights abuses, imprisonment of journalists and opposition figures, and forced disappearances.
- **Economic mismanagement.** Public debt grew from 57% of GDP in 1994 to over 100% by 2017. Tax revenue remained low. The economy remained dependent on groundnuts, tourism, and remittances.
- **Institutional decay.** The civil service was politicised. The judiciary was compromised. The central bank was used to finance government deficits.
- **Deteriorating relations with donors.** The European Union and other donors suspended budget support in 2013–2014. The IMF programme went off track.

- **The 2016 election.** In December 2016, Jammeh lost the presidential election to Adama Barrow. After initially conceding, he refused to step down. ECOWAS intervened militarily, and Jammeh fled to Equatorial Guinea in January 2017.

3.2 The Structural Legacy of the Jammeh Era

By 2017, The Gambia was in crisis:

- **Debt distress.** Public debt was approximately 100% of GDP. The country was at high risk of debt distress.
- **Institutional collapse.** The central bank had been used to finance the government. The treasury was empty.
- **Social crisis.** Poverty was widespread. Youth unemployment was high. The 2015–16 food crisis exposed the vulnerability of the agricultural sector.
- **Political trauma.** The country was emerging from two decades of repression. Reconciliation and trust-building were urgent priorities.

4. The Post-2017 Transition

4.1 The Barrow Government

Adama Barrow assumed office in January 2017. His government faced the daunting task of stabilising the economy, restoring institutions, and addressing the structural weaknesses that had accumulated over decades.

Key developments since 2017:

- **IMF Extended Credit Facility.** In 2020, the IMF approved a three-year ECF arrangement to support macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms.
- **The Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).** Established in 2017, the TRRC investigated human rights abuses during the Jammeh era. Its report, delivered in 2021, documented systematic abuses and recommended prosecutions.
- **The National Development Plan (NDP) 2018–2021.** The first post-Jammeh development plan focused on stabilisation, governance, and economic transformation.
- **The Recovery-Focused National Development Plan (RF-NDP) 2023–2027.** The current framework, branded "YIRIWAA," builds on the NDP and targets seven pillars: resilience, governance, macroeconomic stability, human capital, agriculture, social inclusion, and infrastructure.
- **Economic recovery.** GDP growth averaged 5% annually from 2017 to 2025. Inflation eased from 18.5% in 2023 to 7.0% by October 2025. Extreme poverty declined from 21.5% to 20.3%.

4.2 Persistent Structural Weaknesses

Despite progress, the structure of the economy has not changed:




Figure 2. The structural weaknesses that persist despite recovery

- **Debt remains high.** Public debt is approximately 76.4% of GDP, leaving the country at high risk of debt distress.
- **Tax revenue is low.** Tax revenue averaged just 10.3% of GDP from 2017 to 2024—well below the 15% benchmark.
- **The informal sector dominates.** 81% of workers are in the informal sector.
- **Youth unemployment is high.** 41.3% of youth (15–34) are not in employment, education, or training.
- **Manufacturing is negligible.** Manufacturing's share of GDP is approximately 1.5%.
- **Energy is unreliable.** Blackouts stretch up to 12 hours. Manufacturing firms experience over 19 power outages per month.
- **The education pipeline is weak.** STEM participation at tertiary level shows persistent gender gaps. The University of Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (USET) has graduated only its first cohort of 28 engineers.



PART II

STRUCTURAL DIAGNOSIS

What is the structure of the economy today, and where does it break?

5. What the Country Actually Controls

Every economy can be understood by asking a simple question: what does the state actually control, and what does it merely attempt to control?

The Gambia's public sector controls very little in economic terms:

- The legal framework (common law)
- The port (Banjul Port Authority)
- The river corridor (underutilised)
- The power utility (NAWEC)
- The customs regime
- The investment code (GIEPA)

The state does not control:

- The means of production
- The capital
- The skills base
- The trade finance system
- The shipping registry
- The arbitration framework

5.1 The Overextension Problem

The state attempts to control too many things at once. It owns the power utility (NAWEC), which generates, transmits, distributes, and regulates electricity. It owns the port. It runs state-owned enterprises. It sets the rules and then plays the game.

This creates three problems:

First, the state is spread thin. It cannot be world-class at everything. NAWEC is financially fragile, with 21% system losses and no audited financial statements since 2021. The port is congested. The state enterprises are inefficient.

Second, the state competes with the private sector. When the state owns the power utility and also regulates it, private investors cannot compete fairly. When the state owns the port and also sets customs rules, traders cannot be sure of impartial treatment.

Third, the state loses legitimacy. When the referee also plays the game, the players stop trusting the game. The private sector disengages. The informal sector grows. The base erodes.

5.2 The Legitimacy Deficit

The state's legitimacy—its ability to coordinate economic activity—is near zero. The private sector does not trust the state to be impartial. The informal sector operates outside the state's rules. The youth are disengaged.

This is not a moral failure. It is a structural one. The state is trying to do too much. It needs to retreat from the layers where it has no comparative advantage and focus on the layers where it holds structural power.

6. Macroeconomic Diagnosis

6.1 GDP and Growth

The Gambia's GDP is approximately \$2.5 billion. Growth has averaged 5% annually since 2017. In 2025, growth was 5.9%, driven by agriculture, industry, and services.

But growth is not translating into structural transformation:

- Manufacturing's share of GDP is approximately 1.5%.
- The economy remains dependent on groundnuts, tourism, and re-exports.
- The informal sector accounts for 81% of employment.
- Productivity is low and stagnant.




Figure 3. Approximate shares of GDP: services and remittances dominate; making things barely registers

6.2 Public Debt

Public debt is approximately 76.4% of GDP. The country is at high risk of debt distress. Interest payments consume a significant share of revenue. The government has limited fiscal space for infrastructure or social spending.

6.3 Tax Revenue

Tax revenue averaged just 10.3% of GDP from 2017 to 2024—well below the 15% benchmark. The tax base is narrow. Customs duties are a significant source of revenue, but they distort trade and are vulnerable to smuggling.

6.4 Trade Balance

The Gambia has a structurally weak trade balance. Domestic exports are narrow (groundnuts, cashews, fish). Re-exports account for 85–88% of gross exports. The current account deficit is approximately 5% of GDP, financed by remittances, tourism receipts, and concessional inflows.




Figure 4. Re-exports dominate gross exports

6.5 Remittances

Remittances are a critical lifeline. In 2025, formal remittance inflows reached approximately \$872 million—equivalent to about 30% of GDP. Remittances rival tourism as a source of foreign exchange. They finance consumption, housing, and small businesses. But they also reflect the lack of domestic economic opportunity.

6.6 Inflation

Inflation peaked at 18.5% in 2023, driven by global commodity prices and domestic supply shocks. By late 2025, it had eased to around 7.0–7.9%, supported by a tight monetary stance and lower global commodity prices.

But inflation remains a threat. The dalasi is vulnerable to depreciation. Food prices are volatile. The poor are disproportionately affected.

7. Sectoral Diagnosis

7.1 Agriculture

Agriculture accounts for roughly 20.5–23% of GDP and employs nearly half the workforce. It is the backbone of rural livelihoods.

Key sub-sectors:

- **Groundnuts:** The traditional cash crop. In 2024, in-shell groundnut exports were valued at \$10.8 million. But production is volatile, and most groundnuts are exported raw.
- **Cashews:** Growing in importance. But most cashews are exported raw, with no local processing.
- **Sesame:** A minor but growing export crop.
- **Fishing and aquaculture:** Contributed 9.2% of GDP in 2024, up from 5.2% in 2015. Fish is a vital source of foreign exchange and employment.
- **Horticulture:** Potential for export to Europe, but limited by cold chain and certification.

The sector is characterised by:

- Low productivity
- Rain-fed cultivation
- Post-harvest losses
- Lack of value addition
- Weak extension services

7.2 Services

The services sector accounts for up to 65% of GDP. It includes tourism, trade, transport, and communications.

- **Tourism:** Contributes approximately 20% of GDP. Tourist arrivals rose to 233,113 in 2025. But the sector is seasonal, vulnerable to external shocks, and associated with social problems including child exploitation.
- **Trade:** The Gambia is a major re-export hub. Over 85% of gross exports are re-exports, primarily to Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal.
- **Transport:** The port and road network are inadequate for the volume of transit trade.
- **Communications:** Mobile penetration is high, but internet quality is poor and expensive.

7.3 Industry

Industry is small and declining. Manufacturing's share of GDP is approximately 1.5%—ranked #183 of 195 countries.

- **Construction:** A major driver of the industrial sector. In 2024, construction's value added was approximately GMD 13.4 billion.
- **Manufacturing:** Includes processing of agricultural commodities and light manufacturing. But the sector is embryonic.
- **Mining:** Negligible. The Gambia has no significant mineral deposits.

7.4 Energy

The energy sector is the critical bottleneck:

- **Installed capacity:** 158 MW. Available capacity has been as low as 40 MW.
- **Peak demand:** Exceeds 140 MW.
- **Imports:** 57% of electricity in Q1 2025—over 50 MW from Senegal.
- **Blackouts:** Up to 12 hours. Manufacturing firms experience over 19 power outages per month.
- **NAWEC:** Vertically integrated, financially fragile, 21% system losses, no audited financial statements since 2021.
- **Tariff:** Industrial tariff is D10.40/kWh (\$0.15). OMVG import at \$0.11/kWh is better but not competitive with North African or Asian industrial power.

The planned additions, and why they remain insufficient for 24/7 industrial power, are examined in Section 12.




Figure 5. Installed capacity looks adequate on paper; dependable supply does not

7.5 Labour Market

The labour market is characterised by:

- **Informality:** 81% of workers are in the informal sector.
- **Youth unemployment:** 41.3% of youth (15–34) are not in employment, education, or training.
- **Gender gap:** Women's participation is 41.9% versus 54.9% for men.
- **Skills mismatch:** The education system produces graduates who lack the skills demanded by employers.
- **Low productivity:** Wages are low, but so is productivity.

7.6 Education

The education system is weak:

- **STEM participation:** Persistent gender gaps, particularly in engineering and information technology.



- **Tertiary enrolment:** Low. The University of Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (USET) has graduated only its first cohort of 28 engineers.
- **Quality:** The quality of education is poor. Learning outcomes are weak.
- **Brain drain:** Many of the brightest Gambians emigrate.



PART III

WHY CONVENTIONAL TOOLS MISS IT

Why has the standard prescription not worked?

8. The Limits of Development Economics

Conventional development economics treats The Gambia as a small, open, poor economy. The prescriptions are predictable:

- Improve the business environment
- Increase tax revenue
- Reduce debt
- Invest in education and health
- Diversify exports
- Strengthen institutions

All of these are correct. None of them are sufficient.

8.1 The Missing Structural Facts

Conventional analysis misses three structural facts:

First, the river is not a border. It is a corridor.

Conventional analysis treats The Gambia as a tiny country surrounded by Senegal. But the Gambia River is the shortest, most direct route from the Atlantic to Bamako. The Port of Banjul is strategically located at the mouth of the Gambia River. A significant portion of goods landed there are not destined for the Gambian market but are trucked to Senegal, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau.

The Gambia is already a transit corridor. The policy framework does not treat it as one.




Figure 6. The river as corridor: the shortest route from the Atlantic to Bamako

Second, common law is not a legal detail. It is a structural advantage.

The Gambia is Anglophone in a Francophone sea. English common law is the legal infrastructure for trade finance, maritime arbitration, ship registry, and international commercial contracts. The country has not exploited this.

Third, the state is overextended.

The state occupies too many roles simultaneously. It regulates, it operates, it competes. NAWEC generates, transmits, distributes, and regulates. The state sets the rules and plays the game.

The result is that the state loses legitimacy. The private sector disengages. The informal sector grows. The base erodes.

8.2 The Missing Diagnosis

Conventional tools prescribe more of the same: more aid, more capacity building, more technical assistance. What is missing is a structural diagnosis.

The state must retreat from the roles where it has no comparative advantage and anchor itself where it holds structural power: the legal framework, the trade rules, the physical infrastructure.

The private sector must be freed to occupy the roles above—tool making, logistics, trade, finance—without the state competing against it.



PART IV

THE BLUEPRINT

What should The Gambia become, and what must be built to get there?

9. Goal and Vision

By 2050, The Gambia is West Africa's premier river-based industrial and logistics hub—a common-law jurisdiction exporting processed goods and trade services to ECOWAS, the Sahel, and global markets.

The goal is not to become a mini-China. It is to become:

- **A tool-making hub:** Supplying the means of production to the region.
- **A logistics corridor:** Moving goods from the Atlantic to the Sahel.
- **A common-law jurisdiction:** Providing the legal infrastructure for trade, arbitration, and finance.
- **A stable currency zone:** Anchoring the dalasi to gold so investors can commit for decades.

9.1 What the Country Should Control

The state should control:

- **The legal framework:** Common law, commercial code, arbitration rules, ship registry.
- **The physical infrastructure:** Port, river, roads, power, digital networks.
- **The trade rules:** Customs, standards, Incoterms, HS codes.

The state should not control:

- The means of production (factories, tools, machinery).
- The logistics firms (freight forwarders, trucking, warehousing).
- The financial institutions (banks, insurers, asset managers).
- The trading firms (commodity traders, brokers).


Those are for the private sector.

9.2 What the Private Sector Should Control

The private sector should control:

- **Tool making:** Machine tools, cutting tools, molds, dies, jigs, fixtures, metrology, automation, parts, software.
- **Agro-processing:** Groundnut oil, cashew processing, fish canning, fruit juice, packaged foods.
- **Light manufacturing:** Plastics, packaging, beverages, construction materials.
- **Logistics:** Freight forwarding, trucking, warehousing, customs brokerage.
- **Finance:** Trade finance, insurance, factoring, commodity finance.
- **Professional services:** Law, accounting, consulting, arbitration.

The state sets the rules. The private sector plays the game.



The state enables. The private sector executes. Neither competes with the other.

Figure 7. The separation of roles that keeps the hub legitimate

10. Education: The Deep Foundation

10.1 The Principle

The foundation is not vocational training. It is deep education in philosophy, mathematics, science, and engineering.

A country that trains welders will always need someone else to design the ship. A country that teaches philosophy, mathematics, science, and engineering will design the ship, write the law that governs it, finance its construction, and arbitrate the disputes that arise from its operation.

That is the difference between a hub and a dependency.

10.2 The Four Pillars

Philosophy

- **Logic:** Formal logic, set theory, proof theory. The foundation of mathematics, law, and clear reasoning.
- **Epistemology:** How we know what we know. Essential for science, evidence law, and institutional design.
- **Ethics & political philosophy:** Justice, rights, obligation. The foundation of common law, constitutional governance, and commercial ethics.
- **Philosophy of law:** Jurisprudence, legal reasoning, precedent. Directly feeds the common-law advantage.
- **Philosophy of science:** Causation, explanation, method. Feeds research and engineering.



Mathematics

- **Pure mathematics:** Analysis, algebra, topology, number theory. The language of everything.
- **Applied mathematics:** Differential equations, numerical methods, optimisation, statistics, probability.
- **Financial mathematics:** Stochastic calculus, risk, derivatives, actuarial science. Feeds the trade-finance and insurance ambitions.
- **Operations research:** Logistics optimisation, scheduling, network flow. Directly relevant to port and corridor management.
- **Cryptography & information theory:** Feeds fintech, digital trade documentation, customs automation.

Science

- **Physics:** Mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, materials. Foundation for engineering.
- **Chemistry:** Organic, inorganic, physical, analytical. Foundation for agro-processing, materials, pharmaceuticals.
- **Biology:** Molecular, cellular, ecological. Foundation for fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture, public health.
- **Earth & environmental science:** Hydrology, coastal systems, climate. Directly relevant to river management and dredging.

Engineering

- **Civil:** Ports, bridges, roads, river works, structures.
- **Mechanical:** Machinery, manufacturing systems, thermal systems.
- **Electrical & electronic:** Power systems, control, communications, embedded systems.
- **Chemical:** Process engineering, agro-processing, materials.
- **Maritime & naval:** Ship design, port engineering, dredging technology.
- **Software & systems:** Computation, networks, data systems, automation.
- **Industrial & systems:** Logistics, supply chains, manufacturing systems, operations.

10.3 The Pipeline




Figure 8. The education pipeline: four pillars first, institutes as the fruit

Years 1–5: Foundations

Restructure the University of Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (USET) around four faculties: Philosophy, Mathematics, Science, Engineering. Expand the College of Science and Engineering (CoSE) campus in Brikama.

Send 500–1,000 Gambians abroad for PhDs in these fields. Condition: return and teach for 5–10 years. Partner with KNUST (Ghana), and with universities in the UK, South Africa, and India.

Secondary school reform: mathematics and science compulsory through graduation. Philosophy and logic introduced at secondary level.

Teacher training: the bottleneck is teachers. The returning doctoral cohort is brought back to teach.

Partnerships: twinning with strong universities in the UK, US, South Africa, India, and China. Not for degrees—for faculty exchange, curriculum, and research collaboration.

Years 6–10: Depth and Specialisation

Establish graduate schools and research institutes:

- **Institute of Metrology:** Measurement science, calibration, uncertainty.
- **Institute of Materials Science:** Alloys, coatings, composites.
- **Institute of Precision Engineering:** Machine tools, cutting tools, molds, dies.
- **Institute of Automation & Control:** Robotics, PLCs, sensors, drives.
- **Institute of Logic & Legal Reasoning:** Commercial law, arbitration, standards.
- **Institute of Mathematical Sciences:** Financial mathematics, operations research, cryptography.
- **Institute of Physical Sciences:** Energy, materials, industrial processes.
- **Institute of Biological Sciences:** Fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture, public health.

- **Institute of River & Coastal Systems:** Hydrology, dredging, port engineering.

These institutes begin training the relevant expertise by Year 10. They are not trade schools. They are research and teaching institutes producing engineers, scientists, and jurists.

Years 11–15: Excellence and Export

Doctoral programmes. Regional students from Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. The Gambia becomes a centre of learning in precision engineering and common-law commercial practice.

Research commercialisation: patents, spin-offs, consulting arms.

Years 16–25: Maturity

The education system is the country's greatest export—not just goods, but expertise. The institutes produce the engineers who design the tools, the jurists who write the contracts, and the financiers who structure the trade.

10.4 Why This Order Matters

- **Philosophy:** produces people who can reason, interpret law, design institutions, and think clearly about governance. Without it, common law is just procedure.
- **Mathematics:** produces people who can model systems, optimise logistics, build financial instruments, and handle risk. Without it, trade finance and insurance are impossible.
- **Science:** produces people who understand materials, processes, biology, and energy. Without it, agro-processing and manufacturing are guesswork.
- **Engineering:** produces people who can design, build, and maintain ports, plants, power systems, and ships. Without it, infrastructure is imported and dependent.

The institutes in Years 6–10 are not the foundation. They are the fruit. They can only run properly if the four pillars are already deep.

10.5 The Hard Truth

This is expensive. It takes 10 years before the first specialised institute is truly functioning. It takes 20 years before the intellectual output is globally recognised.

But it is the only way to build something that lasts.

11. Finance: A Stable Currency for Long-Term Investment

11.1 The Problem

The Gambia's currency, the dalasi, is unstable. It depreciates unpredictably. Inflation erodes savings. Investors cannot commit for the long term because they do not know what the currency will be worth in 25 years.

This is the core problem for infrastructure investment. A port concession is a 25-year commitment. A power plant is a 20-year commitment. A tool-making factory is a 15-year commitment. No rational investor will commit for those time horizons in a currency that can lose half its value in a decade.

11.2 The Solution: Anchoring the Dalasi to Gold

The Gambia can anchor its currency to gold. Not "back" it—that would require a massive gold reserve. But anchor it—use gold as the reference point for the currency's value.

Here is how it works in plain terms:

- The dalasi is replaced by a new currency—the Solidus Dalasi (SD). At launch, 1 SD = 1 defined unit of gold.
- The SD loses value against gold over time according to a predictable, pre-announced rate. The half-life is set at 65 years. That means after 65 years, 2 old SD = 1 new SD. The currency is reset. No confiscation. No surprise. Just a denomination adjustment.
- The Central Bank holds a small gold buffer—no more than 5% of the total gold stock in the system. It uses this buffer to keep the decay rate within the announced band. It does not redeem SD for gold on demand. It does not hold a massive reserve. It just leans against deviations.
- The remaining 95% of gold is distributed—in the hands of individuals, businesses, traders, and banks. It circulates. It settles trade. It is not hoarded in a central bank vault.
- **International trade is settled in gold.** No dollars. No euros. No CFA francs. Mali's gold flows through the Banjul corridor. The Gambia accepts gold for port fees, transit charges, warehouse fees, and services. The gold circulates in the economy.
- **The foreign exchange market ceases to exist.** There is no SD/USD market. No SD/EUR. Only SD/gold, managed by rule. Currency speculation disappears. Competitive devaluation becomes impossible.




Figure 9. The Solidus Dalasi decay path (half-life of 65 years)

11.3 Why This Works for The Gambia

The country is small enough.

GDP ~\$2.5 billion. Too small to threaten anyone. No one holds the dalasi as a reserve. No one trades it in size. No one depends on it. The US will not sanction The Gambia for anchoring to gold. China will not care. The EU will not notice. The IMF will grumble. What will they do? Cut off a country already at 76% debt-to-GDP? The leverage runs the other way.

**It makes investing clearer.**

If I am an investor looking at a 25-year port concession:

- **Under the current dalasi:** I have no idea what the currency will be worth in 25 years.
- **Under the Solidus Dalasi:** I know the decay rate. It is public. It is fixed. I can model it. I can price it.

That is the difference between a speculative frontier market and a jurisdiction where capital can commit for decades.

The Mali-Burkina partnership.

Mali has gold. Burkina Faso has gold. The Gambia has the route, goods, and services. International trade happens in gold.

- **What Mali gets:** A second gateway to the Atlantic. Banjul is closer to Bamako than Abidjan. The river corridor is navigable. Escape from Dakar's chokehold on transit trade. A settlement medium that no foreign power can sanction, freeze, or depreciate. Access to a common-law jurisdiction for contracts, arbitration, and trade finance.
- **What The Gambia gets:** Gold flowing through its corridor as transit fees, port charges, warehouse fees, and service payments. A captive market for its industrial output. The distributed gold stock circulating in its economy. Credibility as the first gold-anchored jurisdiction.
- **What neither needs:** A massive central bank reserve. A currency union with pooled reserves. Anyone's permission.

The gold doesn't sit. It moves. It settles. It circulates. The Central Bank just watches the decay band and holds a tiny buffer.

11.4 The Transition

- **Year 1:** Pass the Solidus Act. Establish the Monetary Authority. Begin gold acquisition.
- **Year 2–3:** Build gold reserves. Educate the public. Train monetary authority staff.
- **Year 4:** Announce the conversion date. Exchange all dalasi for Solidus Dalasi at a fixed rate. Launch.
- **Year 5:** The Solidus Dalasi is the only legal tender. The old dalasi is retired.

The financial system is simple enough that this is feasible. The Gambia does not have a deep bond market, complex derivatives, or a large banking sector. The conversion is manageable.

11.5 The Global Implication

The Gambia becomes the first country in the world with a rule-based gold-anchored currency.

That is not a small thing. That is a brand. That is a statement.

Every monetary economist, every gold analyst, every central banker will look at The Gambia. The country becomes a laboratory. People will write papers about it. Investors will visit. The brand itself attracts capital.

And if it works—if the Solidus Dalasi holds its value, if trade flows, if the port is built—then other small states might follow. Mauritius. Seychelles. Barbados. Small, sovereign states with nothing to lose.

The Gambia becomes the first mover. The first mover gets the attention. The attention gets the capital. The capital builds the hub.

12. Energy: 24/7 Power

12.1 The Hard Constraint

Electricity is the hard constraint. Without 24/7 power, no industrial zone, no cold chain, no port automation, no data centre, no manufacturing.

12.2 The Current Deficit

- **Installed capacity:** 158 MW. Available capacity has been as low as 40 MW.
- **Peak demand:** Exceeds 140 MW.
- **Imports:** 57% of electricity in Q1 2025—over 50 MW from Senegal.
- **Blackouts:** Up to 12 hours. Manufacturing firms experience over 19 power outages per month.
- **NAWEC:** Vertically integrated, financially fragile, 21% system losses, no audited financial statements since 2021.
- **Tariff:** Industrial tariff is D10.40/kWh (\$0.15). OMVG import at \$0.11/kWh is better but not competitive with North African or Asian industrial power.

12.3 Planned Additions

- **Brikama 24 MW unit:** Commissioning targeted for October 2026.
- **Soma 50 MW solar park:** Contracted, with potential to scale to 150 MW with storage.
- **Dangote \$2bn commitment:** Includes a 250 MW solar plant and fuel storage terminal, still at proposal stage.
- **OMVG 225 kV transmission line:** 1,677 km network interconnecting Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia, with 800 MW transfer capacity.

But these additions are insufficient for 24/7 industrial power.

12.4 The NAWEC Problem

NAWEC is the single buyer, holding exclusive rights over transmission and distribution. It is financially fragile:

- 21% system losses (technical and non-technical).
- The government absorbed 75% of NAWEC's debt in 2019—\$150 million. Further interventions followed: \$20 million in July 2024.
- No audited financial statements since 2021.
- The Karpowership deal cost over \$200 million between 2018 and 2025. The Gambia still owes \$19.6 million in arrears.
- Monthly electricity sales average D646 million; purchases cost D480 million, with other expenses at D120 million. Thin margins, vulnerable to dalasi depreciation.

12.5 The Industrial Power Requirement

1. **Baseload capacity:** Solar alone does not provide 24/7 power. Battery storage or gas/hydro baseload is needed.

2. **Redundant transmission:** Industrial zones need dedicated feeders, substation redundancy, and the ability to re-route power.
3. **Affordable industrial tariff:** Current industrial tariff is D10.40/kWh (~\$0.15). OMVG import at \$0.11/kWh is better but not competitive with North African or Asian industrial power.
4. **Independent power for the SEZ:** A dedicated industrial microgrid—solar + battery + gas backup—insulated from NAWEC's grid instability.
5. **A financially viable utility:** NAWEC must be restructured, or the SEZ must be granted direct power purchase agreements with independent producers.

12.6 The Strategic Implication

The Mali partnership and the gold-anchored currency solve the monetary problem. But without electricity, the gold cannot be processed, the goods cannot be manufactured, the cold chain cannot run, the port cannot automate, and the logistics corridor cannot function.

The Gambia does not need to generate all its power domestically. It can import from OMVG. But it needs firm capacity—guaranteed, 24/7, at a predictable price.

That means:

- Long-term PPAs with OMVG and Guinea for hydro.
- Solar + storage for daytime industrial load.
- Gas or heavy fuel oil as backup—and the Dangote fuel terminal would support this.
- A dedicated SEZ microgrid that is not dependent on NAWEC's fragile national grid.

The electricity problem is not technical. It is financial and institutional. The generation capacity exists on paper. The interconnection exists. The solar resource is world-class. What is missing is the capital, the governance, and the political will to build a power system that serves industry, not just households.

The gold-anchored currency makes the financing clearer. A 25-year PPA denominated in gold-anchored currency removes the currency risk that has crippled every previous power project in The Gambia.

13. Infrastructure: The River Corridor

13.1 The Port of Banjul

The Port of Banjul is strategically located at the mouth of the Gambia River. It handles approximately 90% of the country's trade. But it faces significant constraints:

- **Draft:** The channel draft is insufficient for large vessels. Dredging is required.
- **Congestion:** The port is congested. Cargo handling is slow.
- **Equipment:** Cranes and handling equipment are inadequate.
- **Bonded facilities:** There is no bonded corridor for transit goods.

The AfDB is supporting the Banjul Port Expansion Project at \$20.56 million. But this is a fraction of what is needed.

13.2 The River Corridor

The Gambia River is navigable for approximately 240 kilometres by ocean-going vessels and further by smaller craft. It is Africa's only superbly navigable river.

But it is underused. Barge traffic is minimal. There are no river ports at Kuntaur or Basse. The river is a corridor waiting to be activated.

13.3 The Trans-Gambia Corridor

The Senegambia Bridge, opened in 2019, links the northern and southern banks of the Gambia River. It cuts travel times by several hours and transforms a former ferry bottleneck into an economic artery for the region.

The Trans-Gambia Corridor Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is being developed into a logistics and trade hub for Senegal, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau.

13.4 The Badiara–Vélingara–Kalifourou Corridor

This planned corridor is explicitly designed to strengthen cargo routes from Banjul to Mali. It would position The Gambia as a key gateway for regional trade.

13.5 The Sene-Gambia-Mali Rail Link

A proposed rail link connecting Dakar, Banjul, and Bamako would transform the region's logistics infrastructure. It would provide landlocked Mali with a direct rail connection to the Atlantic.

13.6 The Infrastructure Requirement

1. **Deep-water terminal:** A new terminal with 14–16 metre draft at Banjul or a greenfield site at the river mouth.
2. **Dredging programme:** Maintain 8–10 metre draft to Kuntaur.
3. **Bonded corridor status:** For the river from Banjul to the Senegal border.
4. **River ports:** At Kuntaur and Basse for bulk and container traffic.
5. **Road and rail:** To connect the port to Mali and Burkina Faso.
6. **Digital infrastructure:** Customs automation, electronic single window, cargo tracking.

14. Industry: Tool Making as the Core

14.1 The Logic

Every economy needs tools. Every factory, every workshop, every mine, every processing plant needs cutting tools, molds, dies, jigs, fixtures, metrology equipment, machine tools, automation, parts, and software.

The Gambia can make those tools. Not for itself alone—the domestic market is tiny. But for the region. For Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea. For every producer in West Africa.



14.2 Why Tool Making and Not Generic Manufacturing

Generic manufacturing is the most exposed position in the economy. A bottle of juice from Banjul competes with one from Dakar, Lagos, or Guangzhou. The margin goes to whoever can produce cheapest. That is a race to the bottom.

Tool making is different. It is harder to commoditize because it requires:

- **Deep engineering skill:** Metrology, materials science, control theory, precision machining.
- **Precision:** Tolerances measured in microns.
- **Trust:** A machine tool that fails destroys a production line.
- **After-sales service:** Installation, training, maintenance, repair.
- **Relationship:** Not transactional; long-term supply and support.

That is exactly why Switzerland makes watches and machine tools, not bulk chemicals. High value density. Low volume. Deep skill. Small country.

14.3 The Tool-Making Cluster

Sub-layer	What The Gambia makes	Who buys
Cutting tools	Drills, end mills, inserts, taps, abrasives	Every machine shop in the region
Molds & dies	Injection molds, stamping dies, casting dies	Plastics, packaging, metal forming across ECOWAS
Jigs & fixtures	Workholding, vises, chucks, indexing	Assembly operations everywhere
Metrology	Calipers, micrometers, CMMs, gauges, NDT	Quality control in mining, manufacturing, agriculture
Machine tools	Lathes, mills, grinders, EDM, additive	Regional tool rooms and production lines
Automation	Robots, cobots, conveyors, AGVs	Processing plants, warehouses, ports
Parts	Bearings, gears, motors, drives, valves, fasteners, seals	Maintenance, repair, operations across all industries
Software	CAD, CAM, CAE, PLM, MES	Design and control for every producer

14.4 What the Tool-Making Cluster Feeds

- **Agro-processing:** Cutting tools, molds, conveyors, packaging equipment, metrology for quality control.
- **Fisheries:** Processing equipment, cold chain parts, refrigeration components, seals, valves.
- **Light manufacturing:** Molds, dies, jigs, fixtures, assembly systems.
- **Logistics:** Handling equipment, cranes, conveyors, sensors, control systems.
- **Mining (Mali, Burkina):** Drilling tools, crushing equipment parts, conveyors, pumps, valves, metrology.

The Gambia does not compete with China on volume. It competes on precision, proximity, service, and legal certainty.



14.5 The Industrial Estates

- **Banjul (port):** Logistics, warehousing, ship repair, maritime services.
- **Kerewan (agro):** Agro-processing, packaging, cold storage.
- **Kuntaur (bulk):** Bulk cargo, river port, heavy industry.
- **Basse (livestock and grains):** Livestock processing, grain milling, feed production.

15. Logistics: The Corridor

15.1 The Opportunity

Banjul is the shortest, most direct route from the Atlantic to Bamako. Dakar is congested and politically fraught. Abidjan is far. The Gambia River is the natural corridor.

15.2 What Flows

- Mali's gold.
- Burkina's gold.
- Mali's cotton, livestock, grain.
- Burkina's cotton, gold, livestock.
- Guinea-Bissau's cashew.
- Senegal's groundnuts and phosphates.
- And The Gambia's tools flowing back up the corridor.

15.3 The Services Layer

Service	Vehicle
Maritime arbitration	International Commercial Court + Arbitration Centre
Ship registry	Merchant Shipping Act; open registry
Trade finance	Export credit agency, factoring houses, commodity finance
Insurance	Captive insurance, marine insurance, trade credit
Logistics services	Freight forwarding, customs brokerage, warehousing, trucking
Professional services	Law, accounting, consulting, BPO
Fintech	Digital payments, trade documentation, customs tech
Education	Maritime academy, industrial trades, logistics management

15.4 The Private Sector's Role

The state builds the pathways—the port, the river, the roads, the power. The state sets the rules—customs, standards, Incoterms, HS codes.



The private sector provides the routing, the tools, and the execution. Freight forwarders, trucking companies, warehousing firms, customs brokers. The state does not compete with them. The state enables them.

16. The Full Picture: What The Gambia Becomes

Role	The Gambia's Position	What It Provides
Rule-setter	Common law, trade rules, standards, customs	The legal and regulatory framework
Pathway provider	Port, river, roads, power, digital networks	The physical and digital infrastructure
Tool maker	Machine tools, cutting tools, metrology, automation	The means of production for the region
Logistics hub	Transit corridor from Atlantic to Sahel	The route for goods and gold
Currency anchor	Gold-anchored Solidus Dalasi	A stable unit of account for long-term investment

The state does not run factories. It does not run banks. It does not run trading firms. It does not compete with the private sector.

The state sets the rules. The state builds the pathways. The state anchors the currency.

The private sector makes the tools. The private sector moves the goods. The private sector finances the trade.

That is the separation. That is what keeps the hub legitimate.

PART V

IMPLICATIONS AND EXECUTION

What stands in the way, what does it cost, and how is it done?

17. Constraints

17.1 Political Will

This is the binding constraint. The rest are negotiable. But political will is not a switch. It is sustained will across 15–20 years and multiple administrations.

The record:

- The 2024 constitutional reform bill failed in the National Assembly despite being a flagship promise.
- The GIEPA Amendment Bill is moving to reduce tax exemptions—the opposite direction from a nationwide SEZ.
- The SEZ is still a feasibility study.
- The RF-NDP reports slow progress on job creation midway through its term.

That is not a technical failure. That is a political one.

17.2 Capital

The Gambia does not need a massive gold reserve. The gold-anchored currency requires only a small buffer. But the port, the power, the institutes, and the skills require capital.

- The World Bank has approved \$45 million in grant financing for revenue mobilisation and private sector foundations.
- The AfDB is supporting the Banjul Port Expansion Project at \$20.56 million.
- The Dangote commitment, if it materialises, would transform the energy sector.
- But these are fractions of what is needed.

17.3 Time

Ports take 5–10 years. Power plants take 3–7 years. Institutes take 10–15 years to produce world-class graduates. The 25-year frame is not arbitrary. It is the minimum time required to build the system.

17.4 Regional Diplomacy

- Transit rights with Senegal.
- Joint border posts.
- Electronic cargo tracking.
- The Badiara–Vélingara–Kalifourou corridor.
- The Sene-Gambia-Mali Rail Link.

These require sustained engagement with Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso—and with ECOWAS and the AfCFTA framework.

17.5 The Energy Bottleneck

NAWEC's financial fragility, the reliance on imported fossil fuels, and the seasonal unreliability of OMVG supply are immediate constraints. The SEZ microgrid and direct PPAs are the mitigation.

17.6 The Structural Blockers

- Frequent ad hoc interventions rather than a consistent facilitative framework.
- Weak institutional capacity limits the effectiveness of public-private collaboration.
- GIEPA Amendment Bill still pending in the National Assembly.
- "Manufacturing" remains vaguely defined in the GIEPA Act.
- Access to finance and energy costs are consistently cited as the top constraints for private sector growth.

18. Budgets

18.1 Phase 1 (Years 1–5): Foundation

Item	Estimated Cost
Legal architecture (gold-anchored currency, commercial court, ship registry)	\$5–10 million
Deep-water terminal feasibility and design	\$20–50 million
Dredging programme (initial)	\$50–100 million
Solar + battery industrial park (50 MW)	\$100–150 million
Maritime & Logistics Academy	\$20–30 million
Industrial Trades Institute	\$15–25 million
Scholarships (2,000 students abroad)	\$100–200 million
Total Phase 1	\$310–565 million

18.2 Phase 2 (Years 6–10): Build-Out

Item	Estimated Cost
Deep-water terminal construction	\$500 million–1 billion
River port upgrades (Kuntaur, Basse)	\$100–200 million
Solar expansion (200 MW)	\$300–400 million
Graduate schools and research institutes	\$200–300 million
Transit corridor infrastructure (roads, border posts)	\$200–300 million
Total Phase 2	\$1.3–2.2 billion



18.3 Phase 3 (Years 11–15): Scale

Item	Estimated Cost
Industrial estates along river	\$500 million–1 billion
Regional distribution centre	\$200–300 million
Arbitration centre and ship registry	\$50–100 million
Total Phase 3	\$750 million–1.4 billion

18.4 Phase 4–5 (Years 16–25): Consolidation and Maturity

Item	Estimated Cost
Full corridor integration (Banjul to Basse)	\$1–2 billion
Institutional export (law, arbitration, registry)	\$100–200 million
Total Phase 4–5	\$1.1–2.2 billion

18.5 Total 25-Year Investment




Figure 10. Investment by phase (ranges as estimated in this blueprint)

\$3.5–6.4 billion

This is not small. But it is not impossible. The AfDB, World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and bilateral partners—China, India, Gulf states—are potential financiers. The gold-anchored currency, by removing currency risk, makes the financing clearer.

19. The Execution Sequence

The 25-year sequence at a glance




Figure 11. Execution roadmap, Years 1–25

19.1 Phase 1: Foundation (Years 1–5)

Legal & institutional architecture

- Enact a National Economic Zone Act—one regime for the entire country. Single investment authority, single customs code, single commercial court.
- Establish an International Commercial Court with common-law judges and arbitration-friendly rules.
- Create a Ship Registry under the Merchant Shipping Act—open registry, competitive fees.
- Pass a Trade Finance & Insurance Act enabling captive insurance, trade credit, and export guarantee instruments.
- **One-stop shop:** company registration, customs, immigration, tax, and utility connection in a single digital platform. Target: 48 hours.
- **Pass the Solidus Act.** Establish the Monetary Authority. Begin gold acquisition.

Port & river

- Commission a deep-water terminal at Banjul or a greenfield site at the river mouth. Target draft: 14–16 metres.
- Begin dredging programme for the river channel—maintain 8–10 metre draft to Kuntaur.
- Designate bonded corridor status for the river from Banjul to the Senegal border.

Energy

- Solar + battery industrial park at a strategic river location. 50 MW initial, expandable.
- Regional grid interconnection study with Senegal (OMVG).



Skills

- Maritime & Logistics Academy—cadets, stevedores, customs brokers, freight forwarders.
- Industrial Trades Institute—welding, electrical, mechanical, process operations.
- Apprenticeship pipeline with anchor investors.
- **Restructure USET around four faculties:** Philosophy, Mathematics, Science, Engineering.
- Send 500–1,000 Gambians abroad for PhDs in these fields.

Quick wins

- **Cashew and groundnut processing plants.** Cold storage for fisheries.
- Packaging and construction materials for the domestic and regional market.

19.2 Phase 2: Build-Out (Years 6–10)

Port & logistics

- **Deep-water terminal operational.** Transit corridor to Mali formalised—bilateral agreement, joint border post, electronic cargo tracking.
- Barge service on the river for bulk cargo.
- **Free port status for Banjul:** transit goods, re-exports, and manufacturing inputs move under bond nationwide.

Industry

- **Agro-processing cluster:** Groundnut oil and cake, cashew shelling and roasting, sesame hulling, fish canning and fishmeal, horticulture processing.
- **Tool-making cluster:** Cutting tools, molds, dies, jigs, fixtures, metrology, machine tools, automation, parts, software.
- **Light manufacturing:** Plastics, packaging, beverages, assembly (solar components, electrical goods, simple machinery).
- **Construction materials:** Grinding, blocks, roofing, pipes—for regional export.

Services

- **Maritime services cluster:** Ship registry, maritime arbitration, insurance, bunkering, crew management, ship repair.
- **Trade finance:** Export credit, factoring, warehouse receipts, commodity finance.
- **Professional services:** Law, accounting, logistics consulting, customs brokerage.

Energy

- **Expand solar park to 200 MW.** Add gas-to-power if regional supply materialises.
- **Reliable industrial tariff:** target under \$0.10/kWh.

Education

- **Graduate schools in each faculty:** Master's and PhD programmes.
- **Research institutes:** Institute of Metrology, Institute of Materials Science, Institute of Precision Engineering, Institute of Automation & Control, Institute of Logic & Legal Reasoning.
- Specialised institutes begin training the relevant expertise.

19.3 Phase 3: Scale (Years 11–15)

Logistics hub

- Banjul becomes the second gateway to Bamako—competing with Dakar and Abidjan on cost, speed, and reliability.
- River ports at Kuntaur and Basse operational for bulk and container traffic.
- **Regional distribution centre:** Goods imported, warehoused, and re-exported to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Guinea, and beyond.

Industry

- **Value chains deepen:** From raw processing to finished goods. Peanut butter, cashew snacks, fish fillets, fruit juice, packaged foods for regional supermarkets.
- **Industrial estates along the river:** Banjul (port), Kerewan (agro), Kuntaur (bulk), Basse (livestock and grains).

Services

- **Arbitration centre:** The Gambia as neutral seat for West African commercial disputes.
- Ship registry among top 20 globally by tonnage.
- **Fintech & trade tech:** Digital trade documentation, electronic bills of lading, customs automation.

Education

- Doctoral programmes producing original research.
- **The Gambia as a regional centre of learning:** students from Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and beyond.
- **Research commercialisation:** patents, spin-offs, consulting arms.

19.4 Phase 4: Consolidation (Years 16–20)

- **Industrial GDP share:** Manufacturing and processing at 15–20% of GDP (from ~1.5% today).
- **Transit trade:** 5–10 million tonnes annually through Banjul.
- **Services export:** Maritime, legal, financial, and logistics services contributing 10%+ of GDP.
- **Skills:** 50,000+ technically trained workers; net exporter of logistics and maritime professionals.
- **Regional integration:** The Gambia as the common-law bridge between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa.

19.5 Phase 5: Maturity (Years 21–25)

- **The Gambia as Singapore of West Africa:** Small, high-income, service-and-trade-driven.
- **Per capita income:** Upper-middle-income (\$4,000–\$6,000).
- **Fiscal independence:** Tax revenue 20%+ of GDP, no dependence on customs alone.
- **Institutional export:** Gambian commercial law, arbitration, and ship registry used across the region.
- **The river:** Fully integrated corridor—Banjul to Basse—with industrial, logistics, and energy infrastructure along its length.




Figure 12. From today to Year 25: the shifts the blueprint aims to deliver

20. The Institutional Architecture

- **National Economic Zone Authority:** Single regulator for investment, customs, and SEZ.
- **Gambia Ports & River Authority:** Port, dredging, barge, and corridor management.
- **International Commercial Court:** Common-law bench, arbitration-friendly.
- **Gambia Ship Registry:** Open registry, digital, competitive.
- **Trade Finance & Insurance Corporation:** Export credit, guarantees, marine insurance.
- **Maritime & Logistics Academy:** Skills pipeline.
- **Industrial Development Bank:** Long-term capital for anchor investors.
- **Monetary Authority:** Rule-operator for the gold-anchored currency.

21. The Control Loop

The strategy is not a one-time plan. It is a continuous cycle:




Figure 13. The control loop

1. **Diagnose:** Re-assess the structure. Where are we?
2. **Purpose:** Re-name the goal. Where are we going?
3. **Constraints:** Re-assess constraints. What limits us?
4. **Resources:** Re-assess resources. What do we have?
5. **Options:** Re-generate options. What can we do?
6. **Select:** Re-select. Which move fits?
7. **Execute:** Execute step by step.
8. **Measure:** Measure the effect.
9. **Control:** Adjust. Repeat.

The loop never ends. The economy never stops moving. The cycle continues.

22. The Measurement Dashboard

Metric	What It Measures	Frequency
Growth	Is GDP growing?	Quarterly
Manufacturing share	Is manufacturing growing as a share of GDP?	Annually
Transit volume	How much cargo moves through Banjul?	Monthly
Power reliability	How many blackouts? What is the industrial tariff?	Monthly
Tax revenue	Is tax revenue growing as a share of GDP?	Quarterly
Youth employment	Are youth finding jobs?	Annually



Metric	What It Measures	Frequency
Education output	How many engineers, scientists, jurists graduate?	Annually
Investment	Is FDI growing? Are long-term contracts being signed?	Quarterly

23. The One-Page Summary

- **Diagnose.** The Gambia has a navigable river, a common-law legal system, and a strategic location on the Atlantic. But the state is overextended. It tries to do too much—regulating, operating, competing. The result is near-zero legitimacy. The private sector disengages. The informal sector grows.
- **Purpose.** Become a tool-making hub and logistics corridor for the region. Supply the means of production to Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau. Move goods from the Atlantic to the Sahel. Anchor the currency to gold so investors can commit for decades.
- **Constraints.** Political will, capital, time, regional diplomacy, energy.
- **Resources.** The Gambia River, English common law, the Mali-Burkina gold corridor, the ECOWAS/AfCFTA market.
- **Options.** Build the legal framework. Build the infrastructure. Build the skills. Anchor the currency. Let the private sector make the tools, move the goods, and finance the trade.
- **Select.** Focus on tool making and logistics. Do not compete with the private sector. Set the rules. Build the pathways. Anchor the currency.
- **Execute.** Phase 1: foundations. Phase 2: build-out. Phase 3: scale. Phase 4–5: consolidation.
- **Measure.** Growth. Manufacturing share. Transit volume. Power reliability. Tax revenue. Youth employment. Education output. Investment.
- **Control.** The loop never ends. Re-diagnose. Re-assess. Re-execute.

24. Conclusion

The Gambia's structural diagnosis reveals a country with genuine latent advantages—a navigable river, a common-law legal system, a strategic location on the Atlantic, and a gold corridor to Mali and Burkina Faso—that have not been exploited.

The conventional tools of development economics miss these advantages because they treat The Gambia as a generic small, open, poor economy. They prescribe more aid, more capacity building, more technical assistance. They do not prescribe structural transformation.

The blueprint proposed here is not a theory. It is an architecture. It identifies what the state should control and what it should not. It specifies the goal, the education, the finance, the energy, the infrastructure, the industrial policy, and the logistics. It provides a 25-year sequence with budgets and constraints.

The binding constraint is political will. The rest are negotiable.



The Gambia has a chance. A very big chance. The river is the corridor. Common law is the differentiator. Gold is the anchor. Tool making is the core. The 25-year frame is the discipline.

Set the rules. Build the pathways. Anchor the currency. Let the private sector do the rest.

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